I'm using "file_get_contents" in the following way:
(the script below is posted on, for example https://siteA.com/checkifvalid.php ...notice the URL is httpS)
<?php
//there is a login form on this URL and the entries put in the form are used to set the username & password variables below.
$username = "someusername";
$password = "somepassword";
$secretkey = "slkd89087235";
$yesorno = file_get_contents("httpS://siteB.com/checkdatabase.php?username=$username&password=$password&secretkey=$secretkey");
if ($yesorno == 'yes') {
//details are valid, so something
} else {
//details aren't valid, display they aren't valid
}
?>
The "checkdatabase.php" script gets the username & password using _GET and grabs the variables from the URL and then cross references those login details to see if they are valid or not. If they are, it echos "yes" if not, it echos "no".
The checkdatabase.php script is set to only run if both the username, password & secret key parameters have been passed, and then only if the secret key value that has been passed matches the secret key stored within that php script.
There will also be a limit to the number of times "http://siteA.com/checkifvalid.php" can be entered in a given span of time to prevent a type of "brute force" attack guessing user/pass combos.
My question is, how secure is the above method seeing as both URLs are using httpS?
Should I encrypt the values sent? Or is what is above secure already?
[UPDATE] After a few comments, I've realised I read and answered your question too quickly. I'ev changed my mind.
To answer your exact question
HTTPS is as safe as your private key
Unless your attacker has access to the private SSL key, HTTPS is safe. If your server is ever compromised, then so is HTTPS until you generate a new key.
Prefer POST over GET
Second of all, if you're really going to use HTTP for this, you should use POST instead of GET.
1) The semantic reason: you're asking the other server to do something. That operation is not idempotent but the GET method is (at least in theory). As #Gumbo pointed out in the comments, you're only doing a check and not running any operations on the destination server so the comment about idempotence doesn't apply here.
2) Your password could show up in access logs. Even though different stacks seem to handle HTTPS loggin in different ways by default, you shouldn't take any chances and assume GET requests will end up in a log file somewhere.
You can use cURL to do the POST like this: PHP + curl, HTTP POST sample code?
Don't post/store plain text passwords
Store and post an encrypted password
Your master DB should not store plain text passwords. Instead, encrypt it before saving it, then encrypt the submitted user input before comparing.
Use a shared public key
Instead of posting a plain text usermame/password/secret, you could implement a shared key. This is essentially the same mechanism used by HTTPS. Using this method you could safely send this request over HTTP.
Read up on public-key cryptography, it's really easy to understand. Implement it using openssl_public_encrypt().
Read more about that last one here: Output of openssl_public_encrypt() and openssl_private_encrypt()
Different approaches
Query the remote DB directly
By far the simplest, setup the MysQL daemon on siteB to accept remote connections from siteA only, and query the siteB DB directly from siteA. This doesn't involve HTTP at all. Just makre sure your MySQL password is secure, restrict by IP, and don't store plain text passwords.
Write an OAUTH provider service
From Wikipedia:
[OAUTH] provides a process for end-users to authorize third-party
access to their server resources without sharing their credentials
(typically, a username and password pair), using user-agent
redirections.
Here's the first article I found about writing your own: http://toys.lerdorf.com/archives/55-Writing-an-OAuth-Provider-Service.html
You might be better off using something like the OAUTH component in Zend Framework or something similar if that's the path you go down.
Related
Say I have a PHP application and want the users data to be encrypted before it it gets to the server (to prove to users that their data will not be data mined or resold for advertising).
Similar question was asked here ( Secure Javascript encryption library? ) and implies that this is not going to work, but with the increase in privacy interest amonsgt users this requirement is only going to get greater over time.
Example, using the Stanford library (http://crypto.stanford.edu/sjcl/) a web form has an additional ‘long’ password field which the user pastes in (probably from email for example)
sjcl.encrypt(txtPassword, txtFormFieldToBeEncrypted)
The encrypted data is sent to the PHP page, and the process is reversed when the page is loaded.
Would this work if the users used Chrome or another browser that remembers form values - obviously this is not a secure result, but would this be effective enough to keep the users information private from the host server?
EDIT: Just to be clear, I am only interested in making the information invisible to the host server, and understand that this solution wont protect from 3rd party attacks
Protection on the page is useless, for the simple fact that the encryption key / mechanism will also be in the scope of the page and can thus be tampered with by a malicious party (or by the user itself when inspecting the page).
To avoid data going over the line unencrypted there is also no reason to "roll your own"(tm), because for that there is SSL.
If you want to make sure that the data that you receive on the server was actually originating from a page that you control, you can rely on CSRF protection.
First of all use SSL it is for an only way for secure communication. If you make encryption in JavaScript it is trivial to decrypt your message (because all your code with keys is public).
If you worry about CFRS attack use anti-forgery token (more here: http://bkcore.com/blog/code/nocsrf-php-class.html)
It's perfectly possible to do this, Lastpass for instance built their business model on it. All their server does is store an encrypted blob which they cannot do anything with, all encryption and decryption happens on the client; including a Javascript implementation in the browser. The entire blob of encrypted data is downloaded into the client, where the user's password decrypts it; and in reverse on the way back up to the server.
So if your question is whether it's possible: absolutely. It's also a lot of work, since you will need to be providing the same en-/decryption code for as many platforms as you want to support. You'll also need to secure every context where that code will run, to prevent third parties from injecting code which would allow them to access the client side decrypted data. So, everything needs to go over SSL with no 3rd party content being allowed to be injected.
Here are a bunch of reasons why javascript encryption in the browser is almost always a bad idea.
You need to think deeply about your trust model. Do the users trust the server? If not, there is no hope for trustworthy javascript crypto since the crypto software itself comes from the server. If the users do trust the server, why does the data need to be encrypted client-side? Just use SSL to secure the connection, then have the server encrypt the data before storing it.
I'm sitting here and working on a small project, in this case it's between PHP and Obj-c.
What is best practice for secure authentication between these?
something like
myhost?do=login&user=my_username&password=my_password
feels a bit unsecure since the username and password is posted open.
I guess i could do some SSL for this(?), but does any one have another good example for a good solution?
My thought is that a login sets a auth_key to the user table (MySQL) and if the above GET-variables are correct, it will return userid and this auth key. Then on every thing i do against the PHP, this auth key is updated and returned to the user (obj-c program) and everything that is done on the server is authenticated against this key, this just for not "showing" the password every time and when a key is used, it's useless since it's renewed...
This, however, can't stop anyone for doing this manually since the key is recieved and updated on a login.
Any ideas for making this more secure, or am i just paranoid?
The distinction between GET and POST doesn't actually matter - both are HTTP requests, and as long as you don't encrypt your data, the plain body of the request can be sniffed.
Of course a login should be as a POST req, but just because it is not idempotent, and may have side-effects [db writing, session start, and so].
You may just want to switch to SSL over HTTPS protocol to be sure your data is safe.
As a [really] minimum protection, you may use Basic HTTP Auth, which encodes login credential in Base64 before sending them - you can do this easily with RestKit.
Use POST for username and password forms along with SSL
I am trying to implement a web service and need some (very) simple Authenticate to restrict access to the service.
I found out about HMAC and I think I understand how to implement it. But I have a couple of questions in mind.
Let's say I have this HTML Form on the consumer side. When making a GET/POST request to my server.
Is is enough to create a hash of: public_key using the secret_key?
OR, do I need to create a hash of the entire POST variables/array?
I'm thinking it would be enough to send the hash of the public_key only but just wanted to make sure and ask you guys.
I am planning to do this:
Create a hash of the public_key
Put the hash in a hidden field or in the URL as a param together with the public_key (or client_id) and other POST/GET variables.
Receive on my server and verify the hash against the database by recreating the hash of the public_key using the secret_key.
If the hash matches, I accept the POST/GET requests.
Your thoughts?
Clarification: public_key is like the client unique id where I can use to identify what secret key to use to generate the hash on the server.
The pubkey is just used as an alternative way to recognize the user. It could be the user email as well, by the way since you don't likely want to expose your user data to their programmer (or to potential sniffers) you create a unique identifier for each user. It's all it means. Then you need a private key to sign your hash.
Of course to make it worth it you have to sign all unique request data, otherwise someone could alter your request body and you wouldn't be able to detect it (MITM attack).
You also should care of creating a timestamp that must be included in the HMAC itself, then pass it alongside with the request. This way you can make the signature expirable and so you are not exposed to replay attacks (someone steals the request and without modifying it replies it against the server, operating multiple times the same action... think what a problem if it's a request to pay for your service, your user would be very very angry with you).
Also remember (nobody does) to encrypt also the Request-URI inside the HMAC itself and also the HTTP method (aka verb) if you're using a RESTful webservice, otherwise malicious users will be able to send the request to other URIs or (using RESTful services) change the meaning of your request, so a valid GET can become a potential DELETE.
An example could be: user wants to see all its data, makes a GET request, a Man in the Middle reads the request and changes GET with DELETE. You are not given the opportunity to detect that something has been changed if it's not inside your HMAC you can check about, so you receive a DELETE request and boom! you destroy all user data.
So always remember: everything is essential to your request must be validable
And if you rely on a HMAC then you must encrypt everything you need to trust the request.
Also always remember to start designing your system by denying all request, then if you can validate them perform requested actions. This way you always fall back on denied requests. It's better to have a user email telling you that he cannot do something that have your user data propagated on the net.
Use TLS. It fixes this and a host of problems you haven't even thought of yet.
I have a server with mysql information stored on it. Now i need my Iphone application to be able to log in to a account and update information stored in the the database. So i was wondering, what would be the best way to go about this?
Shall i just use POST to send data to a PHP script and then echo a response for wether the user can login or not(The username and password match) ?
It's just this seems unsecure, also do i need to create some kind of session once the log in stage has been completed?
I have never done this before, so would be really grateful of any help!
Thanks very much
You described the common way to do it. You need some sort of a webserivce you can "talk" with. It's done in the way you post the data to the webserivce, the webserivce (e.g. written in PHP) opens a connection to the database and returns wether the request/login was successful.
If you just send the password in clear text, than it's unsecure you are right. I use two things to make the communication more secure.
SSL: If possible make a secure connections. But it's possible that you do not have the option to connect through ssl.
Password hashing: You can at least hash the password. In a normal case the username is public in an application, but the password isn't. A hashing function is function that returns a string that looks a little bit random to humans. Hash functions are one way functions. There's no way to go back to the original string (if you don't have a few super computers and a few hundred years of time). So once you retrieved a hashed password within your webservice, just hash the password in the database too and compare them. A string always returns the same hash if you use the same hash function. Common hash functions are: MD5 or the SHA familiy
I hope my answer helps you any further. Perhaps my approach is not the most secure, but until know no one told me anything better. ;-)
For phone apps, desktop app and some web apps this is a common issue.
Sandro Meier (above) said correctly that if you have SSL access then this is best way to send via a HTTP POST a username and password so anyone else on the network cannot sniff these details.
If you cannot use HTTPS, then I would recommend from your iPhone app.
1. post username + password to the PHP from the iPhone.
2. ON the server in PHP code, check these details, if correct generate some random token eg (KHnkjhasldjfoi&*) you can do this by using the MD5 hash function in PHP.
3. Save this hash in the db so you know which user you sent it back to.
4. Now for all other requests from the app to the PHP include this token with the request (in PHP you will need to check this token and if it is valid, then fetch or update data).
5. This way if someone is trying to sniff the connection they dont have access to the users password, they can only steal the token.
If you want to be 99% secure you need to use a HTTPS connection (but HTTPS can be faked, I wrote about this in Computer World).
The pervious person mentioned using a MD5 hash to send the username password, but this also can be hacked (a user could download you app, find the salt to the MD5 hash and that way they could still steal any password). I think the W3C said that they do not recommend encrypting web forms and password pages as it gives a false sense of security because pretty much anything can be decrypted (I think a Quantum computer can even decrypt HTTPs), they recommend using HTTPs as it provides the most security for sending sensitive data.
W3C Passwords in the clear.
http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/passwordsInTheClear-52
I'm asked to write a Web API for an application (pc executable, not web-app) that will allow sending emails.
A user clicks something, the app communicates with the API which generates an email and sends it out.
I have to make sure noone unauthorised will have access to the API, so I need to make some kind of authentication and I haven't got an idea how to do it correctly.
There will be more applications accessing the API.
First thought was - send username and password, but this doesn't solve the problem really. Because if someone decompiles the application, they'll have the request url and variables including user/password or simply it can just be sniffed.
so... what options do I have?
I'm fairly sure secure connection (SSL) is not available to me at the moment, but still, this won't help me against the decompiling problem, will it?
EDIT
I haven't said that initially, but the user will not be asked for the username/password. It's the application(s) that will have to be authenticated, not users of the application(s).
The distribution of your software is really the crux of the problem. Hashing user names and passwords and storing them in the software isn't any more useful than storing un-hashed values, as either one would work to access the API server. If you're going to implement usernames and passwords for your users, I think you can use that as a pre-cursor to API control without storing the values in the software itself. Let me describe this in two parts.
Request Signatures
The most common method in use for API request verification is request signatures. Basically, before a request is sent to an API server, the parameters in the request are sorted, and a unique key is added to the mix. The whole lot is then used to produce a hash, which is appended to the request. For example:
public static function generateRequestString(array $params, $secretKey)
{
$params['signature'] = self::generateSignature($params, $secretKey);
return http_build_query($params,'','&');
}
public static function generateSignature($secretKey, array $params)
{
$reqString = $secretKey;
ksort($params);
foreach($params as $k => $v)
{
$reqString .= $k . $v;
}
return md5($reqString);
}
You could create an API request query string using the above code simply by calling the generateRequestString() method with an array of all the parameters you wanted to send. The secret key is something that is provided uniquely to each user of the API. Generally you pass in your user id to the API server along with the signature, and the API server uses your id to fetch your secret key from the local database and verify the request in the same way that you built it. Assuming that the key and user id are correct, that user should be the only one able to generate the correct signature. Note that the key is never passed in the API request.
Unfortunately, this requires every user to have a unique key, which is a problem for your desktop app. Which leads me to step two.
Temporal Keys
So you can't distribute keys with the application because it can be decompiled, and the keys would get out. To counter-act that, you could make very short-lived keys.
Assuming that you've implemented a part of the desktop app that asks users for their username and password, you can have the application perform an authentication request to your server. On a successful authentication, you could return a temporal key with the response, which the desktop app could then store for the lifetime of the authorized session, and use for API requests. Because you mentioned that you can't use SSL, this initial authentication is the most vulnerable part, and you have to live with some limitations.
The article Andy E suggested is a good approach (I voted it up). It's basically a handshake to establish a short-lived key that can be used to authenticate. The same key could be used for signature hashing. You could also take your chances and just send the username/password unencrypted and get a temporal key (it would only happen once), but you'd have to be aware that it could be sniffed.
Summary
If you can establish a temporal session key, you won't have to store anything in the client program that can be decompiled. A username/password sent once to your server should be enough to establish that. Once you have that key, you can use it to create requests in the desktop apps, and verify requests on the API server.
I would recommend you check out OAuth. it should definitely help you out in sorting out the security issues with authorizing tools to access your API.
http://oauth.net
Someone is always going to be able to decompile and hunt for the variables. An obfuscator might be able to hide them a little better. Sniffing is also easy without SSL unless you use a private and public keyset to encrypt the request data client side and decrypt server side (but obviously this key will be stored in the client application).
The best thing to do is provide as many layers of protection as you think you will need, creating a secure connection and obfuscating your code. You could look at the following article, which demonstrates a secure connection without using SSL:
http://www.codeproject.com/KB/security/SecureStream.aspx
As mattjames mentioned, you should never store passwords in plain text format. When the user enters their password into the application, store a hash of the password. The same hash should be stored on the server. That way, if the hash is seen by an interceptor they at least wouldn't see the user's original password.
You will need to use SSL if you need to prevent people from seeing the plain text password that is sent from the app over the network to the API.
For the decompilation issue, you would want to store the hash of the password in the API, not the original password. See explanation here: http://phpsec.org/articles/2005/password-hashing.html.