I have been researching into PDO's bindValue(). I know that preparing my SQL statements with PDO is keeping SQL injections from happening.
Code Example:
$stmt = $dbh->prepare('SELECT * FROM articles WHERE id = :id AND title = :title');
$stmt->bindValue(':id', PDO::PARAM_INT);
$stmt->bindValue(':title', PDO::PARAM_STR);
$stmt->execute();
By binding the ID as a number, and the Title was a string, we can limit the damage done when someone tries to do an SQL injection within the code.
Should we always bind our values with a PDO::PARAM_ so we can limit what can be pulled from the database in an SQL injection? Does this add more security with PDO when doing our bindValue()?
There are two questions in one. It is essential not to confuse them
Should we always use a placeholder to represent a variable data in the query?
Should we always use certain function in the application code to follow the above rule?
Also, from the clarification in the comments under the opening post, the third question can be seen:
Should we always use third parameter, or it's OK to let PDO bind all the parameters as strings by default?
1. For the first question the answer is absolutely and definitely - YES.
While for the second one, for sake of code sanity and DRYness -
2. Avoid manual binding when possible.
There are many ways to avoid manual binding. Some of them are:
ORM is an excellent solution for the simple CRUD operations and must have in a modern app. It will hide SQL from you completely, doing the binding behind the scenes:
$user = User::model()->findByPk($id);
Query Builder is also the way to go, disguising SQL in some PHP operators but again hiding the binding behind the scenes:
$user = $db->select('*')->from('users')->where('id = ?', $id)->fetch();
some abstraction library may take care of the passed data by means of type-hinted-placeholders, hiding the actual binding again:
$user = $db->getRow("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =?i", $id);
if you are still using PHP in the last century ways, and have raw PDO all over the code - then you can pass your variables in execute(), still saving yourself a lot of typing:
$stmt = $dbh->prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?');
$stmt->execute([$id]);
$user = $stmt->fetch();
As of the third question - as long as you are binding numbers as strings (but not the opposite!) -
3. It's all right with mysql, to send almost every parameter as a string
as mysql will always convert your data to the proper type. The only case known to me, is a LIMIT clause where you cannot format number as a string - thus, the only related case is one when PDO is set in emulation mode and you have to pass a parameter in LIMIT clause. In all other cases you can omit third parameter, as well as explicit call to bindValue() without any problem.
You should definitely use the prepare API and pass values separately from the query, as opposed to doing plain string interpolation (e.g. "SELECT * FROM foo WHERE bar = '$baz'" → bad).
For binding parameters, you have three options:
bindParam
bindValue
execute
It doesn't really matter which of these you use, they're all equally secure. See these answers for some details about the differences:
Confusion between bindValue() and bindParam()?
Using PDO without binding
When using bindParam or bindValue, passing the third PDO::PARAM_ argument type is optional. If you don't pass it, it defaults to binding the argument as string. That means you may end up with a query equivalent to ... WHERE foo = '42' instead of ... WHERE foo = 42. It depends on your database how it will handle this. MySQL will cast the string to a number automatically as needed, just as PHP does (e.g. in '42' + 1). Other databases may be more fussy about types.
Again, all options are equally safe. If you're trying to bind a string 'foo' using PDO::PARAM_INT, the string will be cast to an integer and accordingly bound as the value 0. There's no possibility for injection.
Yes you should always bind params with prepared statement.
It's more secure, and limit SQL injection. But this is not the only think you must do to query params: a correct type control is required, best if you map a row into an object and throw an exception in it if it has invalid data.
I hope I can be useful!
Yes, binding is the way to go. Or parameterised queries which a more generalized term.
#Theo does a wonderful job explaining why parameterized queries is the way to go
You could also use stored procedures for additional security but is an over kill if you have one application to one database. Its good for multiple applications to one database to ensure consistency when handling data
Related
This works as expected:
$st = $db->prepare('SELECT COUNT(1) WHERE EXISTS (SELECT * FROM ' . $table_name . ')');
$st->execute(array());
This throws a syntax error:
$st = $db->prepare('SELECT COUNT(1) WHERE EXISTS (SELECT * FROM :tblname )');
$st->execute(array('tblname' => $table_name));
As per the comments, "data can only be bound when it can be represented as a numeric or a quoted string literal. A table name can neither be a numeric or string literal."
What is the reasoning behind this?
Parameters are not just a string substitution. That's actually what makes them good at preventing SQL injection vulnerabilities.
(Well, in some clients, they emulate query parameters using string substitution. PDO has this behavior if you set the PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES attribute. But I'll talk about true parameters.)
The reason that parameters are not string substitution is that they are combined with the SQL query after it has been parsed by the database server. The parsing step validates your SQL syntax is correct, and validates that the tables and columns you have named in the query in fact exist.
The only thing that can be omitted from the parsing step are constant values in expressions. The parser sees one of the parameter placeholders and knows that that token acts as if you had used a single scalar constant value. Therefore it can proceed with the syntax validation.
The following example is not valid SQL syntax because you can't SELECT from a constant string:
SELECT COUNT(1) WHERE EXISTS (SELECT * FROM 'mytable' )
But that's how the syntax will be interpreted if the table name is passed as a parameter. The SQL engine doesn't know the exact value of the parameter, but it knows it should be treated as a string value.
This way, the query can be parsed once (during the prepare() call), and then once parsed, you can execute the prepared query multiple times, plugging in different values for each execution (the execute() call). Those parameter values cannot change the logic of the query, only the constant values.
And that's the benefit for protecting against SQL injection. SQL injection occurs when dynamic content is combined with a query before it is parsed, so the content can change the syntax and therefore the logic of the query, making it do something you didn't intend. But if parameters are combined after parsing, they can't affect the logic.
In SQL, table, column, and schema names cannot be provided as parameters to prepared statements. It's not a PDO thing, it's a language restriction of SQL itself.
Many RDBMSs have semantics for preparing statements once and then using the prepared statements multiple times with different data. This is efficient because the RDBMS software works out the query plan – the operations it must do to satisfy the query – just once, and then reuses it with different data. If table or column names were variables in prepared statements the RDBMS software could not do that. PDO supports multiple RDBMSs so it enforces this language feature.
Prepared statements are also a security feature. When you provide parameters and use the statement, the data types of parameters get checked carefully. That would be much harder if table or column names could be parameters.
And, it's the way SQL was defined a generation ago. Data in RDBMSs lasts for decades.
I've watched Computerphile's video many times on this subject(for any of you who want, this is the link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jKylhJtPmI). He provides some really good advice on how to combat SQL Injection and make your app more effective. These are the key points from his video:
Don't use straight and unprotected SQL commands because this is the way hackers can perform a SQL Injection, stealing, modifying, or even deleting your data.
A good approach is to use the mysql_real_escape_string(String s) function. This basically places on the start of every dangerous character (/,", {, }, etc) a slash (/). So basically this makes the quote or slash inside the string useless.
The best thing to do is to use prepared statements. So, you basically say:
SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE username = ?
Later you go and replace the question mark with the string you want to input as the user name. This has the advantage of not confusing PHP or any other fault-tolerant language, and using this simple and (kind of, hacky) elegant solution to just say replace this with the string and tell the language that what is given is just a string and nothing more than that.
That is good and all, but this video is really outdated. It was made way back in 2013 and since then a lot of new technology has emerged. So, I tried to search the internet to find if there were any new approaches or if this is the one. But the problem was that either I couldn't find it or either I found something that was super confusing.
So, my question is: Is there a better and enhanced way to combat SQL Injection that has been introduced, or if prepared statements are still the norm and if they are vulnerable to any kind of attack?
Parameter binding is still the best solution in most examples of combining dynamic data with an SQL query.
You should understand why. It's NOT just doing a string substitution for you. You could do that yourself.
It works because it separates the dynamic value from the SQL-parsing step. The RDBMS parses the SQL syntax during prepare():
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE username = ?");
After this point, the RDBMS knows that the ? must only be a single scalar value. Not anything else. Not a list of values, not a column name, not an expression, not a subquery, not a UNION to a second SELECT query, etc.
Then you send the value to be bound to that placeholder in the execute step.
$stmt->execute( [ "taraiordanov" ] );
The value is sent to the RDBMS server, and it takes its place in the query but only as a value and then the query can be executed.
This is allows you to execute the query multiple times with different values plugged in. Even though the SQL parser only needed to parse the query once. It remembers how to plug a new value into the original prepared SQL query, so you can execute() as many times as you want:
$stmt->execute( [ "hpotter" ] );
$stmt->execute( [ "hgranger" ] );
$stmt->execute( [ "rweasley" ] );
...
Are prepared statements the best? Yes, they are. It doesn't matter that the advice comes from 2013, it's still true. Actually, this feature about SQL dates back a lot further than that.
So are query parameters the foolproof way of defending against SQL injection? Yes they are, if you need to combine a variable as a value in SQL. That is, you intend for the parameter to substitute in your query where you would otherwise use a quoted string literal, a quoted date literal, or a numeric literal.
But there are other things you might need to do with queries too. Sometimes you need to build an SQL query piece by piece based on conditions in your application. Like what if you want to do a search for username but sometimes also add a term to your search for last_login date? A parameter can't add a whole new term to the search.
This isn't allowed:
$OTHER_TERMS = "and last_login > '2019-04-01'";
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE username = ? ?");
$stmt->execute( [ "taraiordanov", $OTHER_TERMS ] ); // DOES NOT WORK
What if you want to allow the user to request sorting a result, and you want to let the user choose which column to sort by, and whether to sort ascending or descending?
$stmt = $pdo->prepare("SELECT * FROM USERS WHERE username = ? ORDER BY ? ?");
$stmt->execute( [ "taraiordanov", "last_login", "DESC" ] ); // DOES NOT WORK
In these cases, you must put the column names and syntax for query terms into your SQL string before prepare(). You just have to be extra careful not to let untrusted input contaminate the dynamic parts you put in the query. That is, make sure it's based on string values you have complete control over in your code, not anything from outside the app, like user input or a file or the result of calling an API.
Re comments:
The idea Martin is adding is sometimes called whitelisting. I'll write out Martin's example in a more readable manner:
switch ($_GET['order']) {
case "desc":
$sqlOrder = "DESC";
break;
default:
$sqlOrder = "ASC";
break;
}
I replaced Martin's case "asc" with default because then if the user input is anything else -- even something malicious -- the only thing that can happen is that any other input will default to SQL order ASC.
This means there are only two possible outcomes, ASC or DESC. Once your code has complete control over the possible values, and you know both values are safe, then you can interpolate the value into your SQL query.
In short: always keep in your mind an assumption that $_GET and $_POST may contain malicious content. It's easy for a client to put anything they want into the request. They are not limited by the values in your HTML form.
Write your code defensively with that assumption in mind.
Another tip: Many people think that client input in $_GET and $_POST are the only inputs you need to protect against. This is not true! Any source of input can contain problematic content. Reading a file and using that in your SQL query, or calling an API, for example.
Even data that has previously been inserted in your database safely can introduce SQL injection if you use it wrong.
Is there any point in saving PDO prepared statements for reuse in a session?
I'm building a site that uses MySQL fulltext queries, which I'm putting together in my PHP, like
SELECT * FROM table
WHERE MATCH (title) AGAINST ($search_string IN BOOLEAN MODE) AND
MATCH (keywords) AGAINST ($keywords IN BOOLEAN MODE)
ORDER BY $order_by $asc_desc
It seems to take a lot longer to run this kind of query when I prepare and execute it with bound parameters, than when I just prepare and execute a query string with the values included. But I need to use prepared statements to prevent the risk of SQL injection.
In any session I would very likely run the same query several times, with different parameter values. Would it make sense for me to save the PDOStatement object once it's been created (for example in the session)? If so, what would be the best way to do that? Would it be good practice to save each prepared statement in an associative array as it's created, with the SQL query string as the key for each?
On further reading I found you can't use bound params for the ORDER BY and ASC / DESC part of a statement. When I replace these with fixed values the performance improves.
There is no benefits to store prepare statement into session for reusable purpose,
the expensive cost is on the query execution itself.
If the data you are grabbing constantly changes, then caching the resultset may no longer be valid shortly after you retrieve them.
However, if your data appears to be static:
session_start();
$_SESSION['cachedResultSet'] = $fetchedResultset;
echo $_SESSION['cachedResultSet'][0][0];
# above statement `echo ...` depends on how your result is, be it an array or object
I think it would be acceptable to a degree to store resultsets in session variables, but perhaps it would depend (sorry to be redundant) whether the data changes quickly or on how often you grab this particular resultset, etc...
Hey there, I'm doing some queries to a MySQL database that involves some user-input.. And I was wondering how to prevent injection attacks, like, for example, if someone were to type
"; a-MySQL query here;"
It would be executed, this would allow people access to compromise my system. I'm wondering how i could protect against things like this, possibly create a function that filters out the query looking for bad statements? or perhaps not allowing the ; character?
To sum it all up:
Whats the common practice now adays to prevent injection attacks?
How should I go about it?
How effective will this solution be against people who know what they are doing from changing my database.
The only way is to properly escape user-submitted data. Others have pointed out some ways of doing so.
There's another way: prepared statements and placeholders. Prepared statements are supported by every modern PHP database interface, including mysqli and PDO.
Let's use PDO as a demonstration. Let's say we wanted to update a bit of data in the table foo submitted by a user.
$sql = 'UPDATE foo SET bar = ? WHERE user_id = ?';
$sh = $db->prepare($sql);
$sh->execute(array( $_POST['bar'], $_SESSION['user_id'] ));
The variables in the array passed to execute replace the question mark placeholders in the query. When this happens, they are automatically escaped and quoted. You don't need to manually escape them to make them safe to put in the database!
On the other hand, you will still need to filter them for unexpected content, like HTML, Javascript, letters where you expect numbers, etc. Making data safe to insert into the database is only half of the battle.
An even better way than calling a mysql_escape_string variant is to use bound queries in PDO, so that it's impossible to forget or miss a case since PDO will do the escaping for you when circumstances require it.
See for more:
http://www.electrictoolbox.com/php-pdo-bound-placeholders/
They best solution is to run every piece of input from the wild (user) through this function PHP.net: MySQL Real Escape String This will clean up most - if not all - Injection issues seen today. You would simply need to do something like the following:
$var = mysql_real_escape_string($_GET['var']);
$query = "INSERT INTO foo (var) VALUES (\"$var\");
It's always good practice to force type casting on variables you know should be a type. For instance a numerical identifier:
$id = (INT)$_GET['id'];
or
$id = ( is_numeric($_GET['id']) ? (INT)$_GET['id'] : -1; // replace -1 with FALSE, or NULL, etc
Which will force that variable to be an Integer so you won't end up with $id being "foo" or some other non-numeric.
Historically, I've always used
mysql_real_escape_string()
for all input derived from users that ends up touching the database.
Now that I've completely converted over to MySQLi and I'm using prepared queries with bound parameters, have I effectively eliminated the possibility of SQL injection attacks?
Am I correct in saying I no longer need
mysql_real_escape_string()?
This is my understanding and the basis of a project of mine:
http://sourceforge.net/projects/mysqldoneright/files/Base/MysqlDoneRight-0.23.tar.gz/download
This is not something I want to get wrong though as now that I've released it, it could affect others as well.
All user provided input will now end up in bind_parms.
The queries provided in the prepare phase are static.
Yes. Using the prepared query will escape parameters.
It's not so simple. You can use bound parameters instead of interpolating application variables into SQL expressions in place of literal values only:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM MyTable WHERE id = ".$_GET["id"]; // not safe
$sql = "SELECT * FROM MyTable WHERE id = ?"; // safe
But what if you need to make part of the query dynamic besides a literal value?
$sql = "SELECT * FROM MyTable ORDER BY ".$_GET["sortcolumn"]; // not safe
$sql = "SELECT * FROM MyTable ORDER BY ?"; // doesn't work!
The parameter will always be interpreted as a value, not a column identifier. You can run a query with ORDER BY 'score', which is different from ORDER BY score, and using a parameter will be interpreted as the former -- a constant string 'score', not the value in the column named score.
So there are lots of cases where you have to use dynamic SQL and interpolate application variables into the query to get the results you want. In those cases, query parameters can't help you. You still have to be vigilant and code defensively to prevent SQL injection flaws.
No framework or data-access library can do this work for you. You can always construct a SQL query string that contains a SQL injection flaw, and you do this before the data-access library sees the SQL query. So how is it supposed to know what's intentional and what's a flaw?
Here are the methods to achieve secure SQL queries:
Filter input. Trace any variable data that gets inserted into your SQL queries. Use input filters to strip out illegal characters. For instance, if you expect an integer, make sure the input is constrained to be an integer.
Escape output. Output in this context can be the SQL query which you send to the database server. You know you can use SQL query parameters for values, but what about a column name? You need an escaping/quoting function for identifiers, just like the old mysql_real_escape_string() is for string values.
Code reviews. Get someone to be a second pair of eyes and go over your SQL code, to help you spot places where you neglected to use the above two techniques.
When you bind parameters to a prepared statement, it escapes the data automatically, so you shouldn't escape it before you send it through. Double escaping is usually a bad thing. At the very least, it produces ugly results with extra escaped characters later on.