$_POST security for PHP Webservice - php

I apologize if this question has been asked before, if it has just link me to it in a comment.
So I've created a web-service for an android/iOS app with php that works like this.
The app sends a request to http://www.example.com/ws/getCookingData.php with 2 $_POST paramaters userID and foodType
The php file then queries the database using those two variables and returns a json_encode result.
My worry is that if someone were to discover my web-service link they could spam it with post requests resulting in 100's of call to my database that are just un-needed
Below is an example of my current getData.php file
<?php
$userID = mysql_escape_string($_POST['userID']);
$foodType = mysql_escape_string($_POST['foodType']);
$mysqli = getDB();
echo json_encode(getDate($mysqli, $userID, $foodType); //mysql database interaction is here
$mysqli->close();
?>
There is nothing here preventing hackers from attempting to post malicious SQL statements into my database
So what I'm wondering is if I added a 3rd parameter to my post request called appID would this be a good solution?
For example if I were to update my getData.php file to below would this be much more secure or is there a vulnerability I'm missing?
<?php
$appID = $_POST['appID'];
if($appID === "hardCodedEquivalentID"){
$userID = mysql_escape_string($_POST['userID']);
$foodType = mysql_escape_string($_POST['foodType']);
$mysqli = getDB();
echo json_encode(getDate($mysqli, $userID, $foodType); //mysql database interaction is here
$mysqli->close();
}
?>
If this is a good solution or there is already an equivalent practice that would achieve what I'm trying to do please let me know

First of all, use mysqli or PDO instead of mysql function which is deprecated. Secondly create a function which will authenticate the user and see whether the user has the permission to access the data. And thirdly try to LIMIT the data to 100 or so if possible.
Hardcoding the appId is not the solution. Create unique Id's for each specific registered user and then match that appId against that particular user. And when their session is expired clear the access token. And at the start of their session, you can login in them and create new access token and can use the same for their entire session.

To answer your first question
My worry is that if someone were to discover my web-service link they
could spam it with post requests resulting in 100's of call to my
database that are just un-needed
If someone wants to DoS you then you can't do much in your code to prevent it but you may try using service like cloudflare. Not worth worrying about it at the beginning.
About
There is nothing here preventing hackers from attempting to post
malicious SQL statements into my database
then just read documentation on PDO

1- Use mysql_real_escape_string()
2- Use str_replace(" ","",$_POST['userID']) and str_replace("%20","",$_POST['userID'])(Because malicious attacks involves in using %20 and space to inject sql query)
3- Add this line to the top of the page, so the script only takes request if its been from your website (That's what I am using too!)
$referrer = $_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'];
if (strpos($referrer,"yourwebsite.com")) {
} else {
die();
}

Related

I want to make a secure link

i want to make a code generator link,like
www.website.com/register?code=29U3HTR3H219URH923UH419H94RH1298491U2HERUH1?plan_bought=LowReseller
in a functions file on php that is redirecting an user on that link.
$planned = htmlspecialchars($_GET["planbought"]);
// connect to database
$db = mysqli_connect('localhost', 'root', 'pass');
mysqli_select_db($db,"ronp");
function generateRandomString($length = 16)
{
$pool = '0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';
return substr(str_shuffle(str_repeat($pool, $length)), 0, $length);
}
$code_secure = generateRandomString(17); // OR: generateRandomString(24)
$query = "INSERT INTO codes (code, expired, 'date', plan)
VALUES('$code_secure', '0', date, '$planned')";
mysqli_query($db, $query);
header('Location: register?code=', $code_secure);
?>
Process: After payment,paypal will redirect user on https://website.com/functions_generate-ak9esysgenthos.php?planbought=Low
That link will create a code in database,and will redirect user on https://website.com/register?code_secure=(code)
Now the problem is,i get redirected on "https://website.com/register?code=",not "https://website.com/register?code=(the code created in database,like 'J2498JT9UJ249UTJ293UJ59U123J9RU9U')"
If you look at the documentation for header() you'll see that the second parameter is a boolean value. This parameter specifies if the header should be "forcefully" be replaced. You are incorrectly passing your "secure"* code as that parameter.
What you want to do is concatenate the strings instead of passing your "secure" code as a second parameter. What you want to get is
header('Location: register?code=' . $code_secure);
*The "secure" code you are generating is predictable (as you used this code), if you need a secure code you might want to look into openssl_random_pseudo_bytes before PHP 7.0 and random_bytes() in PHP 7.0 or higher, as demonstrated by this answer.
Furthermore, as mentioned by Raymond Nijland your code is vulnerable to SQL injections. See this excellent answer on how you can prevent SQL injections.
Besides the issues mentioned in Tom Udding's answer, there are at least two other issues:
functions_generate-ak9esysgenthos.php can be accessed without any authentication at all. Moreover, it generates a "secure code" blindly, without determining whether a user is logged in or otherwise authorized to access that page (e.g., without determining whether a payment operation is in progress). This could allow anyone with knowledge of the URL to access functions_generate-ak9esysgenthos.php; depending on how your application is implemented, this could cause orders that weren't paid for or even a denial of service attack (due to the additional order codes clogging your database).
You are generating a random "secure code" without checking whether that code was already used. What if /register?code=... finds two records with the same code? Can your application tolerate the risk of generating the same code for different records? (See also my section on unique random identifiers.)

Prevent off site form posts?

I'm looking for the safest way to not allow my web form, which uses PHP and MySQL, to be posted to from off site. I've done some searching and found that most people suggest setting a hidden field in the form and a session variable with a md5() hash value and check for it on form submission. But that doesn't seem very secure because the md5() hash value can be seen in the source of the form in the hidden value.
Here is my idea to not allow off site form submissions. It's a bit more resource intense with the database calls but looks to be more secure because the code hash is never sent to the client side.
Please take a look at it and see if you can poke any holes in this security measure to prevent off site form posts.
// First time form loads
if (!$_POST) {
session_start();
$code_options = array('A','B','C','D','E','F','G','H','I','J','K','L','M','N','P','Q','R','S','T','U','V','W','X','Y','Z','1','2','3','4','5','6','7','8','9');
for ($i=1; $i<=20; $i++) {
$code .= array_rand(array_flip($code_options), 1);
}
// Insert new record
$con = connect_to_db(); // connects to db
$sql = "INSERT INTO security_table (form_code) values('$code')";
$result = run_query($sql, $con); // runs the query
$_SESSION['formcode'] = $code;
$_SESSION['formid'] = mysql_insert_id();
}
// If form was posted to
if ($_POST) {
session_start();
$con = connect_to_db();
$form_code = mysql_real_escape_string($_SESSION['formcode']);
$form_id = mysql_real_escape_string($_SESSION['formid']);
$sql = "SELECT form_code FROM security_table WHERE form_code = '$form_code' AND form_id = '$form_id '";
$result = run_query($sql, $con);
if (mysql_num_rows($result) > 0) {
// Process the form
// If form processes successfully
$_SESSION['formcode'] = "";
$_SESSION['formid'] = "";
}else{
// Error
}
}
Instead of doing this in your application, you could control access to your site though your web server configuration. Nice separation of concerns if you can do it this way -- the server deals with requests and the application only deals with the logic.
Assuming you're using Apache and you have read/write access to your apache http.conf or a local .htaccess, you can add a rule like this:
<Limit GET POST>
order deny,allow
deny from all
allow from 199.166.210.
allow from .golden.net
allow from proxy.aol.com
allow from fish.wiretap.net
</Limit>
So, deny everyone, except for the few IP or network addresses you chose to allow.
See the Apache docs for the nitty gritty details.
But that doesn't seem very secure because the md5() hash value can be seen in the source of the form in the hidden value.
It doesn't matter. If you encrypt it well enough, the token will be greek to anyone, and therefore impossible to recreate unless you know the key mechanism in the php script. Since you regenerate the token after each post, seeing what it looks like won't help any bad guy.
Your way of securing your form is basically "if you have the session, you're fine". So if the spamming machine has visited your page once, the security layer has been passed. The reason for why you have a client side token is that the spammer has to provide something that only is attainable in your actual form.
There are lots of discussions about secure forms at stackoverflow, have a look at Good Form Security - no CAPTCHA, for example.
Here's a good article explaining different methods of securing a form. I've used these methods with good results.
http://www.campaignmonitor.com/blog/post/3817/stopping-spambots-with-two-simple-captcha-alternatives

How to protect processing files

So I've a php form processing file; say a file name process.php with the codes as
<?php
$value = $_POST['string']; //Assume string is safe for database insertion
$result = mysql_query("INSERT into table values {$value}");
if($result) {
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
?>
Ideally, only someone who's logged in to my website shall be allowed to send that POST request to perform that insertion. But here, anyone who know this processing file's path and the request being sent can send any spoof POST request from any domain (if I'm not wrong). This will lead to insertion of unwanted data into the database.
One thing I did is, before the insertion, I checked whether a user is logged in or not. If not, I ignore the POST request. But how exactly should I secure my processing files from exploits?
As it stands this is vulnerable to SQL Injection. Make sure you use a parametrized query library like PDO for inserting the file and the mysql "blob" or "long blob" type. You should never use mysql_query().
You should also keep track of the user's id for user access control. It doesn't look like you have taken this into consideration.

Prevent Users from Performing an Action Twice

We have some problems with users performing a specific action twice, we have a mechanism to ensure that users can't do it but somehow it still happens. Here is how our current mechanism works:
Client side: The button will be disabled after 1 click.
Server side: We have a key hash in the URL which will be checked against the key stored in SESSIONS, once it matches, the key is deleted.
Database side: Once the action is performed, there is a field to be flagged indicating the user has completed the action.
However, with all these measures, still there are users able to perform the action twice, are there any more safer methods?
Here is the partial code for the database side:
$db->beginTransaction();
// Get the user's datas
$user = $db->queryRow("SELECT flag FROM users WHERE userid = {$auth->getProperty('auth_user_id)}");
if ($user['flag'] != 0) {
$db->rollback();
// Return with error
return false;
}
// Proceed with performing the action
// --- Action Here ---
// Double checking process, the user data is retrieved again
$user = $db->queryRow("SELECT flag FROM users WHERE userid = {$auth->getProperty('auth_user_id)}");
if ($user['flag'] != 0) {
$db->rollback();
// Return with error
return false;
}
// --- The final inserting query ---
// Update the flag
$db->query("UPDATE users SET flag = 1 WHERE userid = {$auth->getProperty('auth_user_id)}");
$db->commit();
return true;
It is good to see that you have taken all measures to defeat the bad guys. Speaking in terms of bad guys:
Client side: This can easily be bypassed by simply disabling javascript. Good to have anyways but again not against bad guys.
Server side: This is important, however make sure that you generate a different hash/key with each submission. Here is a good tutorial at nettutes on how to submit forms in a secure fashion.
Database side: Not sure but I suspect, there might be SQL injection problem. See more info about the SQL Injection and how to possibly fix that.
Finally:
I would recommend to you to check out the:
OWASP PHP Project
The OWASP PHP Project's goal (OWASP PHP Project Roadmap) is to enable developers, systems administrators and application architects to build and deploy secure applications built using the PHP programming language.
Well the JS method and Hash method may be cheated by some notorious guy, but 3rd method seems to be very good in order to protect the redundancy. There must be some programming flaw to get passed this.
Why don't u just check the flag field on the page where you are inserting the values rather than where user performing the action (if you are doing it now)
Pseudocode follows:
<?
$act_id; // contains id of action to be executed
$h = uniqid('');
// this locks action (if it is unlocked) and marks it as being performed by me.
UPDATE actions SET executor = $h WHERE act_id = $act_id AND executor = '';
SELECT * FROM actions WHERE executor = $h;
//
// If above query resulted in some action execute it here
//
// if you want to allow for executing this exact action in the future mark it as not executed
UPDATE actions SET executor = '' WHERE act_id = $act_id;
Important things:
First query should be update claiming
the action for me if it is yet
unclaimed.
Second should be query
grabbing action to execute but only
if it was claimed by me.

Examples of vulnerable PHP code? [closed]

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Ok so me and a friend are doing a mini presentation on PHP security (I'm not really into PHP though) and he asked me to find some examples of vulnerable PHP code (one that is prone to SQL injections and all other types of attacks). I was wondering are there any websites with both good and bad pieces of code showing how you should and shouldn't code?
Basically I will put them into our website and he will try to hack it, then we will show the "proper" website and he will try to hack it again.
SQL injection is easy:
$var = $_POST['var'];
mysql_query("SELECT * FROM sometable WHERE id = $var");
This is easily solved by:
$var = mysql_real_escape_string($_POST['var']);
The other common one is XSS (cross site scripting):
$var = $_POST['var'];
echo "<div>$var</div>\n";
allows you to inject Javascript that is run from your site. There are several ways of dealing with this, for example:
$var = strip_tags($_POST['var']);
and
$var = filter_var($_POST['var'], FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING);
A really common beginner's mistake is forget to terminate script execution after a redirect.
<?php
if ($_SESSION['user_logged_in'] !== true) {
header('Location: /login.php');
}
omg_important_private_functionality_here();
The solution:
if ($_SESSION['user_logged_in'] !== true) {
header('Location: /login.php');
exit();
}
This can be missed when testing in a normal browser, because browsers usually follow the Location header without rendering any of the output of the script.
Oh boy, you won't be short of examples. Just Google PHP tutorial and every single one of them has enough holes to fill the Albert Hall.
Result 1, w3schools. What's their first example to include user input?
Welcome <?php echo $_POST["fname"]; ?>!<br />
Bzzt. HTML injection, repeated throughout every piece of example code. What's their first database query?
$sql="INSERT INTO Persons (FirstName, LastName, Age) VALUES ('$_POST[firstname]','$_POST[lastname]','$_POST[age]')";
Bzzt. SQL injection, you lose. Next.
Result 2, official PHP tutorial. What's the first example of outputting a variable?
echo $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'];
Bzzt. HTML injection. Not an easily-exploitable one, but still, bad practice of the sort that is repeated throughout php.net's learning materials.
Result 3, tizag.com. What's the first example of echoing user input?
echo "You ordered ". $quantity . " " . $item . ".<br />";
Bzzt.
Result 4, freewebmasterhelp.com. Too basic to include much, but still manages:
print "Hello $name"; // Welcome to the user
Bzzt.
Result 5, learnphp-tutorial.com.
<title><?= $greeting ?> World!</title>
Bz...
I could go on.
Is it any wonder the general quality of PHP code in the wild is so disastrous, when this woeful rubbish is what coders are learning?
Bobby Tables
Bobby Tables is a page devoted to detailing the ways that a script can be vulnerable via SQL injection. This is not unique to PHP, however, SQL injection is the cause of many web page vulnerabilities.
It might be someting you want to include in your presentation.
I've seen code like this written in the past:
foreach ($_REQUEST as $var => $val) {
$$var = $val;
}
It's a way to simulate the maligned register_globals option. It means you can access your variables like this:
$myPostedVar
rather than the terribly more complicated:
$_POST['myPostedVar']
The security risk pops up in situations like this:
$hasAdminAccess = get_user_access();
foreach ($_REQUEST as $var => $val) {
$$var = $val;
}
if ($hasAdminAccess) { ... }
Since all you'd have to do is add ?hasAdminAccess=1 to the url, and you're in.
Another example of a sql-injection-vulnerable login script. This is unfortunately very common among new programmers.
$username = $_POST["username"];
$password = $_POST["password"];
$query = "SELECT username, password
FROM users
WHERE (username = '{$username}')
AND (password = '{$password}')";
Today's DailyWTF:
if(strstr($username, '**')) {
$admin = 1;
$username = str_replace('**', '', $username);
$_SESSION['admin'] = 1;
} else {
$admin = 0;
}
CSRF for the win.
<?php
$newEmail = filter_input(INPUT_POST, 'email', FILTER_SANITIZE_EMAIL);
$pdoStatement = $pdoDb->prepare('UPDATE user SET email=:email WHERE ID=:id');
$pdoStatement->execute(array(':email'=>$newEmail, ':id'=>$_SESSION['userId']));
You feel safe with this kind of code. All is good your users can change their emails without injecting SQL because of your code.
But, imagine you have this on your site http://siteA/, one of your users is connected.
With the same browser, he goes on http://siteB/ where some AJAX does the equivalent of this code :
<form method="post" action="http://site/updateMyAccount.php">
<p>
<input name="email" value="badguy#siteB"/>
<input type="submit"/>
</p>
</form>
Your user just got his email changed without him knowing it. If you don't think this kind of attack is dangerous, ask google about it
To help against this kind of attacks, you can either :
Check your user REFERER (far from perfect)
Implement some tokens you had to your forms and check their presence when getting your data back.
Another one is session hijacking. One of the methods to do it is piggybacking.
If your server accepts non cookie sessions, you can have URLs like http://siteA/?PHPSESSID=blabla which means your session ID is blabla.
An attacker can start a session and note his session ID, then give the link http://siteA/?PHPSESSID=attackerSessionId to other users of your website. When these users follow this link, they share the same session as your attacker : a not logged session. So they login.
If the website does not do anything, your attacker and your user are still sharing the same session with the same rights. Bad thing if the user is an admin.
To mitigate this, you have to use session_regenerate_id when your users credentials change (log in and out, goes in administration section etc.).
HTTP Response Splitting attack
If web application is storing the input from an HTTP request in cookie let's say
<?php setcookie("author",$_GET["authorName"]); ?>
It is very prone to HTTP response splitting attack if input is not validated properly for "\r\n" characters.
If an attacker submits a malicious string,such as "AuthorName\r\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n..",then the HTTP response would be split into two responses of the following form:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
Set-cookie: author=AuthorName
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
...
Clearly,the second response is completely controlled by the attacker and can be constructed with any header and body content instead
Check out the Open Web Application Security Project. They have explanations and examples of lots of different kinds of attacks.
http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:Attack
Email header injection attacks are a much bigger pain in the neck then you might suspect (unless you've had to deal with them).
This is very bad:
$to = 'contact#domain.com';
$subject = $_POST["subject"];
$message = $_POST["message"];
$headers = "From: ".$_POST["from"];
mail($to,$subject,$message,$headers);
(code copied from the second reference above.)
The WRONG way to do templates.
<?php
include("header.php");
include($_GET["source"]); //http://www.mysite.com/page.php?source=index.php
include("footer.php");
?>
XSS vulnerabilities are easy to show. Just create a page that puts the value of the GET variable "q" somewhere on the page and then hit the following URL:
http://mysite.com/vulnerable_page.php?q%3D%3Cscript%20type%3D%22javascript%22%3Ealert(document.cookie)%3B%3C%2Fscript%3E
This will cause the user's cookies to be displayed in an alert box.
Allowing upload and not checking extension. Observe:
Site A allows image uploading and displays them.
Cracker guy uploads a file and tricks you to believe its an image file (via HTTP mimetypes). This file has PHP extension and contains malicious code. Then he tries to see his image file and because every PHP extesioned file is executed by PHP, the code is run. He can do anything that apache user can do.
Basic (often security sensitive) operations not working as expected, instead requiring the programmer to use a second "real" version to get non-broken functionality.
The most serious one of these would be where an actual operator is affected: The "==" operator does not work as one would expect, instead the "===" operator is needed to get true equality comparison.
One of the big 3 PHP forum packages was affected by a vulnerability in it's "stay logged in" code. The cookie would contain the user's ID and their password hash. The PHP script would read and cleanse the ID, use it to query the user's correct hash in the database, and then compare it with the one in the cookie to see if they should be automatically logged in.
However the comparison was with ==, so by modifying the cookie, an attacker use a hash "value" of boolean:true, making the hash comparison statement useless. The attacker could thus substitute any user ID to log in without a password.
Allowing people to upload files, whether that API is supposed to be used by users or not. For example, if a program uploads some files to a server, and that program will never upload a bad file, that's fine.
But a hacker could trace what is being sent, and where to. He could find out that it is allowing files to be uploaded.
From there, he could easily upload a php file. Once that's done, it's game over. He now has access to all your data and can destroy or change anything he wants.
Another common mistake is allowing flooding. You should put some sane limits on your data. Don't allow users to input nonsensical data. Why is a user's name 2MB in length? Things like that make it so easy for someone flood your database or filesystem and crash the system due to out of space errors.

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